The geopolitical conflict is not framed by a narrative of democratization, but is accompanied by actions of power projection and deterrence, which limits the prospect of any potential “democratic diffusion.”
The literature on the fall of authoritarian regimes tells a recurring story: regimes rarely collapse simply because a social uprising erupts or a serious crisis occurs. Such a crisis may, on the contrary, activate mechanisms of rallying around the ruling power and temporarily strengthen regime cohesion. Authoritarian regimes are, however, more likely to collapse when the internal architecture of their mechanisms of rule is disrupted. The classic school of analysis on transitions, established in the multi-volume series Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (O’Donnell et al., 1986), showed that transitions often start with cracks within the ruling elite and through negotiations between the regime and organized opposition.
From a different perspective, Skocpol in States and Social Revolutions (1979) argued that revolutionary ruptures are linked to state breakdown, accompanied by international pressure and mass uprising. Overall, the theory does not treat regime collapse as a single moment but as a process of attrition: when power simultaneously loses legitimacy, unity, and enforcement capacity, collapse shifts from a possibility to a realistic prospect.
From this perspective, Iran fits within this framework. Social frustration and economic suffocation are significant pressure factors, but they alone are not enough to break a theocratic regime with especially strong repression mechanisms. The decisive variable, according to these theoretical frameworks, would be a rupture at the very core of the theocratic power axis, particularly if divisions emerge within the Revolutionary Guards or more broadly within the security apparatus. As long as cohesion and coercive capacity are maintained, even serious crises, like the current one in Iran, may prove manageable.
The Arab Spring reignited discussion around the dynamics of social mobilization, showing that mass protest, especially when it cuts across society, can delegitimize an authoritarian regime and even topple its leadership, as occurred in Tunisia and Egypt, without guaranteeing institutional transformation of the system itself. Furthermore, subsequent developments in countries like Syria and Libya demonstrated the limits of protest momentum when it is not accompanied by cracks at the core of state power.
The experience of 2011 also showed that mass social mobilization can act as a crisis accelerator, yet the ultimate outcome depends on whether the military and enforcement mechanisms remain cohesive. Where such mechanisms fragmented or were neutralized, the transitional process became possible; where they remained intact, repression prevailed or a form of authoritarian reorganization and reproduction of the preexisting system occurred in a new guise. For cases like Iran, this experience suggests that the scale of demonstrations is a necessary but not sufficient condition, while the decisive factor for the fall of an authoritarian regime is the erosion of the theocratic and military core of power.
In the initial phase of the campaign against Iran, Donald Trump hinted that weakening, if not toppling, the regime was among the political goals of the intervention. His rapid withdrawal and the shift of his rhetoric toward a narrower, operational purpose (military actions to deter the nuclear program) indicate that regime change was not a coherently planned strategic objective. Before the intervention, Trump had encouraged anti-regime mobilization in Iran, promising support to protesters.
However, the swift downgrading of this goal allows for the interpretation that this rhetoric functioned as a tool to shape a political framework rather than as a commitment to long-term support. In other words, Trump’s encouragement of mobilizations could be seen as an attempt to amplify internal destabilization and international criticism of the Iranian regime, making the already planned U.S. military intervention in Iran appear more necessary and justified.
The classic theory of “democratic diffusion” assumes that political transitions are not isolated events but interdependent processes: the establishment of democratic institutions in one country increases the likelihood of similar transitions in neighboring or economically/culturally connected countries. In other words, diffusion is not merely an outcome but a mechanism operating either through “adaptation,” when non-democratic states emulate successful democratic examples, or through “learning,” when states gather information from the experiences of other countries. However, the current context differs substantially from the processes of past “waves of democratization.” There is no longer a liberal democracy model that functions as an example.
In the U.S., instead, the dominant political narrative is Trump’s MAGA ideology, which promotes a version of national isolationism and emphasis on power without substantive concern for the diffusion of democratic values or who will replace authoritarian leaders in countries such as Iran or Venezuela (The Economist, 8/3/2026). In other words, the geopolitical conflict is not framed by a narrative of democratization, but is accompanied by acts of power projection and deterrence, limiting the prospects of any potential “democratic diffusion.” U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated this explicitly in remarks (2/3/2026): “No muddling through state-building projects, nor enforcing democracy,” highlighting that under Trump’s governance logic, power is exercised to achieve a desired outcome, not to transform an authoritarian regime into a particular—democratic—direction.
From this perspective, the crisis in Iran does not automatically activate mechanisms of democratic diffusion. Under conditions of external conflict, it is at least equally likely that logics of concentrated power and authoritarian retrenchment will be reinforced. At present, little is known about what exactly is happening within the Iranian regime, whose still-hidden core will largely determine the overall outcome.
This article is dedicated to my Iranian classmates from my years of study in Germany, with gratitude for what I learned and with wishes for their well-being.
Vassiliki Georgiadou is Professor of Political Science at Panteion University and Director and Chair of the Board of the National Centre for Social Research (EKKE).
