The days when politicians – and the journalists who follow them – would abandon Berlin in the summer, leaving the media to dwell on trivia, are long gone. The political turbulence in the German capital and across Europe now stems less from domestic quarrels than from international storms. We are watching, in accelerated fashion, the collapse of the old-world order and the scramble for new alliances. At the eye of this storm stand a destructive American president, followed closely by Russia’s Vladimir Putin and, at some distance, Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu. Each, in his own way and with heavy reliance on military force, is exploiting the moment.
I am observing these shifts from Germany, where the cooler climate has again drawn me from Greece’s searing summer. The respite also provides a closer look at how Germans perceive the upheaval. One thing is clear: Germany has yet to find its footing in this new order.
Since May, the country has been governed by a coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD), under Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Their promise was to end years of paralysis under Olaf Scholz’s fractious coalition. “In foreign policy, Germany is back in the Champions League,” one senior government figure declared recently. In global affairs – above all, the search for a future for Ukraine – Germany is indeed more active today than under Scholz, who was seen as overly cautious.
Central to this shift is Merz’s relationship with Donald Trump. The German chancellor has cultivated unusual access to the White House, strengthened by his announcement of a massive military buildup unprecedented in postwar Germany. Much of that spending will flow to U.S. defense companies, which has not escaped Trump’s notice. Merz takes pride in this direct line to Washington and has positioned himself as a broker between Europe’s leaders, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, and the unpredictable occupant of the Oval Office.
Yet Merz’s options are constrained. Germany can continue to expand military aid to Ukraine, but when it comes to security guarantees – the issue now pressing hardest – the political room narrows. Nothing alarms Germans more than being drawn into war with Russia. The very idea of deploying German troops to Ukraine is becoming one of the hottest debates in domestic politics, opposed not only by parts of the SPD but also by parties at the margins demanding a more Russia-friendly course.
The dominance of foreign policy – first Ukraine, then the Middle East – has pushed domestic issues to the margins. But that order cannot last. Europe’s largest economy faces profound challenges. For decades, German prosperity rested on three pillars: cheap Russian energy, an insatiable Chinese market for German exports, and a U.S. security umbrella funded largely by Washington. All three props have collapsed since the beginning of this decade, forcing Germany toward radical reforms for which the public is unprepared.
Demographics compound the problem. A rapidly aging society is stretching the welfare state to its limits. Fewer young people are supporting ever more retirees and patients. How to save Germany’s intricate social system has already exposed deep divisions within the coalition. Meanwhile, the fiscal situation is grim: Germany continues to spend beyond its means. Between 2027 and 2029, the federal budget is projected to face a shortfall of more than €170 billion.
Commentators already doubt whether this still-fresh coalition has the political strength to push through the necessary reforms. Should CDU/CSU and SPD falter, there is one likely beneficiary: the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). Support for Merz’s government is weak. A recent poll shows more than two-thirds of Germans dissatisfied with him, accusing the chancellor of breaking campaign promises. The AfD now polls at 26 percent, just ahead of the CDU/CSU. The SPD has sunk further, languishing at 13 percent.
In his bestseller Last Chance (Letzte Chance), journalist Robin Alexander speaks of a “breaking of taboos around the AfD in broad parts of society.” Germany’s political system is undergoing profound structural change with implications for Europe: the contest, Alexander argues, is no longer primarily between centrist parties, but between the center as a whole and the extremes. The key question in the months ahead will be how the CDU handles the far right. For years, its firewall against cooperation with the AfD seemed solid. But cracks are appearing. According to one survey, 40 percent of Germans oppose the “firewall” that bans cooperation with the AfD.
Germany is entering unsettled times. What once seemed unthinkable is edging into the realm of the possible. With regional elections looming in five states next year, more than half the public already expects the AfD to capture its first state premiership. That prospect underscores how quickly Germany’s political landscape is shifting, caught between the demands of global power politics and the erosion of taboos at home.
Dr. Ronald Meinardus is a Senior Research Fellow and Coordinator of Research Projects on Greek-German relations at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Athens.
