Shira Efron, Distinguished Israel Policy Chair and Senior Fellow at RAND and a fellow at the Israel Policy Forum, speaks to To Vima about what comes next for Gaza and Israel after the recent Israel–Hamas agreement.
Middle East expert, distinguished Israel Policy Chair and Senior Fellow @RAND Shira Efron.
We now have a proven agreement between Israel and Hamas. How did we get here — what pushed both sides to step back? Does the Trump plan pave a realistic path from ceasefire to peace?
There were mutual incentives for a ceasefire agreement. Israel wanted to recover its hostages — the living and the dead — and Hamas wanted the release of detainees. By the time the deal was signed, continued fighting suited neither side: diplomatically Israel was under strain, and Hamas had taken a serious blow and needs to regroup.
The first phase of the deal — Israeli forces withdrawing from parts of the Gaza Strip and the release of hostages — is the easiest to implement. The next stages of the Trump plan are the hard part: disarming Hamas, a full Israeli withdrawal, creating a multinational security force and assembling an administrative authority. Remember, of the 20 points in the Trump outline only four are to be applied in the initial phase; the document reads more like a list of principles than a detailed roadmap. Still, the Trump proposal is coherent in essence. He is effectively the only actor who could leverage pressure on Israel and then worked with Qatar and Turkey to push Hamas.
So, in the short term we have good news and we should see some progress in the coming months. But in the longer term all actors — from Israel and the United States to Qatar and Turkey — must show goodwill and apply the right pressure on Hamas. Beyond forcing Hamas to surrender arms, there must be a political horizon for the Palestinians: an alternative Palestinian government, reconciliation among Palestinian factions; Palestinians must stop being at war with each other. Overall the headlines are positive, but the hard work lies ahead. This horrific war must lead to a diplomatic shift for both Israelis and Palestinians; otherwise it will be yet another missed opportunity.
Many commentators note the paradox that Israel has achieved some military objectives while suffering repeated diplomatic setbacks. Do you agree?
We are seeing a series of paradoxes. Palestinians have gained sympathy and legitimacy for their statehood claim while being further from statehood than ever; for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank conditions are the worst since the Nakba in 1947. Conversely, Israel has struck hard at adversaries across the region, yet it is more isolated — regionally and globally — than at any time recently. This is a lesson about Israel’s limits and what military means can achieve. We saw Israeli operations exceed strategic aims, as in Syria and especially the strike in Doha, which gave the impression that the Netanyahu government was acting beyond accepted bounds. Such actions naturally unsettled the international community.
Israel’s image has been damaged by the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Is there a way back in how the international community views the country?
Diplomatically and strategically the war has cost Israel dearly. Images from Gaza have tested alliances with many states — particularly in Europe — and the argument that Israel is a democratic partner in a troubled, authoritarian neighbourhood has lost some of its force. Israeli leaders assume a familiar pattern will recur: the country’s image suffers during wars, but once the fighting stops and the western media attention fades, criticism recedes and people recognise what Israel achieved. I’m not sure that pattern will repeat this time. I’m in Crete and I see anti-Israel graffiti everywhere — something we would not have seen so openly in previous years.
There is, however, a further problem that needs emphasizing. Many in Europe — and to a lesser extent in the US — conflate Hamas with some kind of liberation movement. But Hamas is the same group that imposes a violent dictatorship on its own people. It is a terrorist organisation; calling for its disarmament is entirely logical. The problem with parts of the progressive and left-wing discourse is that it delegitimises not just the Israeli government but all of Israel’s society — musicians, artists, academics — precisely the sectors of Israeli society that are most liberal and progressive.
How engaged are Israelis with what happened in Gaza? Do images of suffering and the country’s global reception concern them?
Most Israelis oppose the Netanyahu government — which is why we did not have elections — and it is telling that 75% of public opinion does not want the war to continue because they want the hostages returned and see no benefit in prolonged fighting. Most Israelis are exhausted and want a return to some form of normality. After the first year of the war much of society has moved past rage and vengeance. It is true that Israeli public opinion doesn’t show deep engagement with Gaza; that is sad, and several reasons explain it. Domestic media did not relay images of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza until quite recently. When the images did arrive, the government linked them to Hamas or to the UN and advanced various rationales. As a result, many Israelis live in an echo chamber, in denial.
Can we expect positive developments in the West Bank as a result of the deal? What role can the Palestinian Authority play?
The Palestinian Authority has a problem: beyond issues of corruption, it is not proactive — it seems to await assignment rather than take initiative. It must be more active and seize the opportunity: Arab states that want a Gaza solution and have pledged to fund reconstruction want to see the Palestinian Authority play a role. We return to the central point: all actors must contribute to the next phases of the agreement and show the willingness to find sustainable solutions that include the West Bank. From this particular Israeli government I do not expect anything different than continued punishment of Palestinians in the West Bank. It did not invent this approach but it intensified it to an unimaginable degree.
