European integration is a paradox. Thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas and Étienne Balibar have pointed out that it was founded on the shared national sovereignty of member states, yet it has not created a “place of the Political” where the citizens of Europe would recognize themselves as members of the same political community.
Until the late 1980s, the EEC had limited influence on daily life, relying on what was called “permissive consensus.” After Maastricht, it became more interventionist, developed common policies, and in 2008 entered a new phase of crisis and simultaneous completion, intervening in the core of member states’ fiscal sovereignty. Its political dimension became evident, with figures like Jean-Claude Juncker entering our living rooms, and the European public sphere becoming politicized and stirring passions.
Today, the EU finds itself at an existential crossroads: democracy is challenged by illiberal regimes within, social achievements are threatened as inequalities grow, and geopolitical influence is squeezed between the US and China. Are these signs of decline, or does the saying still hold that “Europe progresses through its crises”? And how do we in Greece view this, given our long-standing ambivalence about our European belonging?
There are two main aspects to how we perceive Europe: how we evaluate it and where we want it to go. On the first, we are rather pessimistic than optimistic: 41% have a positive view of the EU, while 53% have a negative view—with negative assessments prevailing recently. In those who feel like outsiders and “outside the walls,” negative evaluations are even stronger (64%), indicating that they do not see Europe as a protective framework.
However, pessimism does not necessarily translate into a desire for “less Europe.” Almost two-thirds want more integration and a stronger EU (62%). As with the initial question, the preference for a return to national sovereignty is stronger among outsiders, while “more Europe” is favored more passionately by insiders and the middle-to-upper social classes, as well as those who place themselves in the middle of the political spectrum (center-left, center, center-right).
Naturally, those who view the EU positively tend to support deeper integration. Interestingly, among those with a negative opinion of the EU as it exists today, views on where it should go are divided: 48% believe more integration is needed, while 47% favor less. People’s perceptions, therefore, appear more complex than the simple binary of “Eurosceptics vs. Europhiles.” One can be dissatisfied with the EU’s direction yet want “more Europe,” reject it and desire a return to the national framework, or favor Europe but in the form of a “Europe of nations,” and so on.
Let us consider four dimensions of European integration: prosperity, geopolitical power, utilitarian benefits, and democracy.
Regarding prosperity, a narrow majority believe that Europe remains the region of the world with “the highest quality of life” (50% vs. 46% who disagree). The utilitarian dimension is evaluated more positively: two-thirds (67%) believe that EU member states “have more to gain than to lose from participation.” These views are more strongly held by those who want “more Europe,” who assess the EU positively, place themselves in the center of the political spectrum (center-left to center-right), belong to middle and upper social classes, and feel “inside the walls” (agreement among outsiders is weaker regarding prosperity).
The other two dimensions reflect the darker side. In the democratic dimension, the notorious EU democratic deficit is confirmed: 56% consider it a “bureaucratic and undemocratic” organization. Notably, this view prevails, even marginally, among those who support greater EU integration (50% vs. 48%)—showing that one can be critical of Europe while still desiring deeper integration. This perception of the EU as a distant “black box” is stronger among those at the extremes of the political spectrum (far-left and far-right), in lower social classes, and among outsiders.
Even more concerning is the geopolitical dimension. A vast majority believe that Europe’s influence in the world is limited (83%). Here, there are no significant differences: both those wanting more and less Europe agree, as do leftists and rightists, workers and upper classes, insiders and outsiders. Europe, once a global reference point, is losing its luster.
What are the risks? Threats are both internal and external, though the former are weightier. Top of the list are social inequalities, which threaten the social gains (51%), followed by the far-right as a threat to democratic achievements (32%). There is also external pressure, as Europe is perceived to “shrink” under the influence of major geopolitical players. One is Russia (29%), in clear relation to its aggression on European soil. The second is unexpected: the US (25%), which seems to be weakening ties with Europe—while China or the big-tech companies currently seem a more distant threat.
Europe does not excite us, yet we want more of it. Its social-democratic dimension remains valuable, though we believe it is partially threatened by our own inertia. Whether Europe will “deepen” through its crisis remains an open question. This will, of course, depend on the choices made in the—so far absent—common “place of the Political.”
Ioannis Balampanidis is a political analyst and head of political and social research at Metron Analysis.
