When German Chancellor Friedrich Merz arrived in Ankara this week for his first major trip outside the European Union, the symbolism was unmistakable. Aside from his inaugural visit to Washington, the Turkish capital was his first destination beyond the EU’s borders – a choice underscoring Turkey’s centrality in German foreign policy.
Merz’s message was clear: Turkey matters, and Berlin wants to draw Ankara more firmly into Europe’s evolving security architecture. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s geopolitical weight has grown – not least because of its control over Black Sea access and its role as a critical, if unpredictable, NATO member. Even as President Erdoğan’s stance toward Moscow remains ambivalent, Western capitals have increasingly come to accept that engagement, not exclusion, is the viable approach with an at times obstinate ally.
Just two days before Merz’s arrival, Britain’s prime minister Keir Starmer was in Ankara to finalize the multi-billion-euro Eurofighter deal – a move that London had lobbied Berlin hard to support. Germany’s approval of that historic arms agreement marks a turning point. After years of hesitation under the previous coalition, Realpolitik has reasserted itself as the guiding principle of Berlin’s foreign relations. The era when value-based diplomacy – championed by the Greens and Social Democrats – dominated Germany’s tone toward Turkey appears to be fading.
Still, Merz did not entirely abandon Europe’s democratic vocabulary. In his press conference with Erdoğan, he referred to the “Copenhagen criteria”, the official set of requirements any country must meet to join the EU such es the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities, and noted, with diplomatic understatement, that Turkey’s judiciary “still does not meet what we expect in the European Union.” It was an unmistakable signal that Berlin sees no realistic path for Turkish EU membership under current conditions. Instead, Germany envisions a closer economic and security partnership short of full accession – a stance widely shared across EU capitals.
Back home, Merz’s approach has drawn criticism from segments of the German media and opposition figures who accuse him of going soft on Erdoğan’s authoritarian drift. That criticism, however, seems misplaced. The chancellor met representatives of Turkey’s embattled civil society on the first evening of his visit without public fanfare and voiced public concern about the rule of law. For a conservative leader known more for fiscal orthodoxy than moral grandstanding, that was a notable gesture – if still a cautious one.
Merz’s visit signals a strategic consolidation within Germany’s government. For the first time in years, both the chancellery and the foreign ministry are controlled by the same party, the Christian Democrats. Gone are the mixed messages of the Merkel–Scholz eras, when internal coalition divides often blurred Berlin’s stance toward Ankara. Germany now speaks with one voice – pragmatic, security-oriented, and the declared intent to embrace and not isolate the Turks. Not even the stark differences over Gaza, laid bare once again as Merz and Erdoğan sparred in front of live TV cameras, are likely to change that. Despite their disagreements, officials in Berlin are aware of how valuable Erdoğan’s direct line to the Hamas leadership is in this fragile phase of the conflict.
Berlin’s professed appreciation of Turkey’s role which Merz has displayed unsettles some observers in Greece, where the German chancellor’s Ankara visit was followed with visible concern. Athens has long feared that Germany’s eagerness to engage Turkey might come at the expense of Greek interests in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. For now, German diplomats regard Greek-Turkish relations as relatively stable and see no imminent risk of escalation like the 2020 maritime standoff that forced Angela Merkel’s government into shuttle diplomacy. Still Germany’s readiness to deepen military cooperation with Ankara while assuring that the use of the Eurofighter jets “against another member of NATO or a EU member state is unimaginable”, to quote the recent assurance given by German foreign minister Johan Wadephul, offers limited comfort to Athens.
In Berlin’s view, Turkey’s inclusion in Europe’s new security framework is essential. Crucially, Germany is not alone in that belief. Important countries such as Poland, Italy, and Spain share the same assessment; even France, traditionally Greece’s strongest ally, has turned its back on Athens over the issue of Meteor missiles for Turkey, which seem to be an important part of the Eurofighter deal.
Back home, Merz faces a different set of issues. His coalition with the Social Democrats is plagued by policy disagreements, from social welfare reform to economic liberalization. Internal divisions have delayed crucial decisions and eroded public confidence in his leadership. Disillusioned voters have turned increasingly toward the far-right Alternative for Germany, which thrives on perceptions of drift and disunity.
Whether external Realpolitik can balance internal weakness is an open question. Still, one thing is clear: Germany, under Friedrich Merz, has re-entered the world of power politics – and Turkey stands once again at the center of Berlin’s strategic map.
Dr. Ronald Meinardus is a senior research fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).
