“Far and Beloved.” The phrase captures affection wrapped in distance — the perfect title, editor Richard Jackson decided, for a collection of oral histories from U.S. diplomats who served in Greece between 1940 and 2020.
“I’m often asked about America’s role in Greece and what Americans really think of this country,” Jackson writes in his introduction. “I even thought of calling the book What Do Americans Really Think About Us Greeks? but after much hesitation, I chose the more measured title you see on the cover. As my research went on, my respect and admiration only grew for the generations of American diplomats who served here.”
The post at the U.S. Embassy on Athens’s Vasilissis Sofias Avenue has long been among the most demanding in the diplomatic world — sometimes feeling like a political minefield. And “far and beloved” perfectly expresses, on both sides, the relationship that Greeks and Americans have often preferred: affectionate but uneasy, close but wary.
Athens has always needed U.S. support but resented Washington’s heavy hand. Washington, in turn, sought to guide developments in a pivotal outpost of Western defense. Yet many American diplomats found themselves alternately fascinated and frustrated by Greece’s political and social realities.
Containing the Communist Threat
For much of the 20th century, Washington’s instinct was to send career diplomats to Athens. Their mission: to contain the communist threat, preserve fragile balances in the Eastern Mediterranean, prevent fractures in NATO’s southeastern flank, and uphold State Department protocol — all while showing enough flexibility and ingenuity to navigate the crises that erupted with regularity.
From Peurifoy and Labouisse to Talbot, Tasca, Stearns, and later Keeley, Niles, Miller, Ries, and Pyatt, the challenges were strikingly consistent.
Could there have been an ambassador with name recognition rather than diplomatic experience, that could have managed post–Civil War Greece — a country sustained by American aid and haunted by fears of communist overthrow?
“Back then, we provided two-thirds of Greece’s foreign exchange,” recalls James Warren, an economic analyst with the Marshall Plan mission in Athens from 1948 onward. “The country needed about $400 million. We gave them $280 million.”
The Truman Doctrine, announced in 1947 amid Greece’s civil war, cemented America’s role. U.S. observer Norbert Anschutz, stationed near southern Albania, investigated the flow of military aid from socialist countries to the Greek Communist guerrillas. “The Western powers said all the right things, and the Eastern bloc questioned them,” he remembers. “But did the Greeks always believe the West’s promises?”
“Greeks Are a Volatile Mediterranean People”
“You can never put relations with Greece on autopilot — they’re a volatile Mediterranean people,” said Monteagle Stearns, political counselor in Athens (1958–62) and later U.S. ambassador(1981-85).
During the 1960s, as the Cyprus issue deepened tensions among Athens, Ankara, and Washington, the embassy required every ounce of diplomatic skill to avoid disaster. So naturally, the question arises: how much diplomatic experience was needed to avoid a worse case scenario?
At the time, Queen Frederica unhelpfully often interfered in politics, during the governments of Konstantinos Karamanlis and later during the Union of the Centre government under George Papandreou. “Some of the criticism was exaggerated,” Stearns reflects, “but she wasn’t a natural diplomat. And unintentionally, the U.S., especially through the CIA, helped reinforce her image as a behind-the-scenes power player.”
Stearns later became friends with Andreas Papandreou, who went on to become prime minister himself. Their families were neighbors in Athens. “My wife, Toni, used to babysit George — Andreas’s eldest son — who later became prime minister himself,” he recalls with a smile.
“Greeks Expected to Be Treated as Equals”
“Greeks would tell us, ‘We’re not Nicaragua. We’re the cradle of democracy — we know elections and democracy,’” remembers Herbert Brewster, political counselor in Athens from 1961 to 1965. “That was the hardest part — they expected to be treated as equals.”
Brewster’s recollections are often blunt, even cynical. “Most Greek MPs were between 55 and 70. You couldn’t become a minister unless you were an MP — and once you were, the goal was to get a ministry so you could distribute money and jobs.”
The Colonels’ Coup and an Embassy Divided
Then came April 21, 1967 and the U.S. Embassy was caught off guard. Maybe they had been expecting a generals’ coup and instead, the colonels struck first.
“We were split in three,” recalls Robert Keeley, then a political officer. “Some thought the coup was better than chaos, some were disappointed but willing to work with it, and some of us believed we should reject it outright and try to reverse it.” History shows which group prevailed.
Back in Washington, Brewster, who was serving in the Office of Greek Affairs, woke Secretary of State Dean Rusk to deliver the news. “Don’t get so upset, Mr. Brewster,” Rusk replied. “It’s my 91st coup.” Brewster shot back: “Yes, but this one’s in the cradle of democracy.”.
Death and Destruction in Cyprus
Few stories capture the volatility of U.S. policy in the region better than that of Thomas D. Boyatt, director of Cyprus Affairs in Washington from 1971 to 1974. “We lost all three sides: the Greeks, the Turks, and the Cypriots,” he said. “We brought death and destruction to the island. Kissinger told me, ‘You’re relieved of your duties.’ And that was that.”
A New Era: Kimberly Guilfoyle in Athens
What does Kimberly Guilfoyle, the new U.S. ambassador to Greece, have to do with all this? On the surface, nothing. Yet her appointment signals a new political and cultural era under Donald Trump’s second term.
For the first time, Washington is sending to Athens, Ankara, and soon Nicosia ambassadors drawn not from the diplomatic corps or the diaspora community, but from business and media — people chosen for loyalty to the president rather than for their experience in crisis diplomacy. It is also that the first time that the U.S. ambassador to Greece is going to be a woman.
Whether this reflects neglect or supreme confidence remains to be seen. What’s clear is that today’s Eastern Mediterranean is anything but stable — full of traps rather than opportunities.
During her Senate confirmation, Guilfoyle showed she was well-briefed on regional energy projects. But that doesn’t mean she will dictate Athens’s foreign policy or pressure it into concessions.
Her Turkish counterpart, Tom Barrack, operates under the same “deliverables” logic: producing tangible results that serve U.S. interests above all else.
History may not repeat itself, but Jackson’s title still feels right: “Far and Beloved.” The new US ambassador to Greece faces the same challenge as her predecessors — to navigate one of America’s most paradoxical partnerships, in a land where diplomacy, politics, and passion are forever intertwined.
