There is an unwritten rule in politics: crises are the ultimate stress test for governing narratives. It is precisely there, where the edifice appears solid, that pressure reveals the cracks, bringing to the surface what had long remained on the margins.
In exactly this way, Donald Trump‘s return to the White House has acted as an X-ray for New Democracy. Despite the forewarned “wild” nature of his term, within the party there were those who saw in the new situation an opportunity, feeling that the political climate now favours their own positions.
At the forefront of this “Trumpian” fascination stood Adonis Georgiadis, the current Minister of Health, who never concealed his admiration for the 47th President, rushing to become an informal “ambassador” for him in Athens immediately after his re-election. Beside him, Makis Voridis, an MP on the far-right spectrum of the party, highlighted the “ideological kinship” of the right-wing party with Trump’s agenda, placing strong emphasis on immigration and security issues.
Thanos Plevris, the Minister for Migration and Asylum, and Notis Mitarakis, an MP from the island of Chios, added to the atmosphere of enthusiasm, with the former signalling a hard ideological counter-offensive by characteristically declaring that one should neither “respect nor honour the struggles of the Left”, as he considers them “struggles against the nation”, a rhetorical line that Trump himself would likely endorse warmly.
At the same time, Vassilis Kikilias, the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy, seeks to build a privileged bridge to the Oval Office, claiming that there has “never before been an ambassador who speaks directly with Trump”, and making sure to remain in constant communication with Kimberly Guilfoyle. the US Ambassador to Greece.
Opposite them, however, a front of party figures watches developments with visible anxiety, knowing how precarious Greece’s position becomes when international rules bend.
The sharpest expression of this fear came recently from Dora Bakoyannis, an MP and sister of the Prime Minister, who at a meeting with party members in the northern suburbs remarked pointedly: “We got entangled with Donald Trump, and the key question now is how quickly we can disentangle ourselves.”
The Geometry of Disagreements
From the coordinated American-Israeli strikes on Iran to the abduction of Maduro, the two “readings” within New Democracy have ceased to be merely theoretical differences. They are taking on flesh, bone, and political weight, with the manner in which Trump’s Washington ostentatiously disregards the foundations of postwar International Law provoking a simmering unease within Maximos Mansion (the Prime Minister’s office).
On one side stands the wing that sees in the “Trump doctrine” a familiar truth. “The world has always worked this way,” a senior government minister observes, “it’s just that now someone is saying it without pretence.”
In an attempt to downplay the impression of internal discord, the same minister is quick to stress the party’s capacity for synthesis: “The party has many souls, that is New Democracy’s strength, to combine different voices ranging from the Centre-Left all the way to the Far Right, a systemic and controlled Far Right.”
Within this framework, government figures believe that internal disagreement within New Democracy is not necessarily a weakness, as long as it does not degenerate into paralysis or, worse, uncontrollable discord at precisely the moment the country needs a decisive and clear voice.
“Adaptability to the Trump accelerator is necessary,” notes one party figure, “but there is a difference between flexibility and manoeuvres that push us to lower the flag of International Law, our only constant in the face of any revisionist claim.”
Amid the internal scandal-mongering that is scratching the government’s surface, the same minister retreats to the shelter of governmental stability. “Foreign policy under Kyriakos Mitsotakis remains our strong card,” he says, adding that “the conflagration in the Middle East resulted in Cyprus being treated for the first time as Europe’s outermost border, activating the reflexes of a European Union that lags behind events, with Greece assuming a coordinating role in the whole choreography.” He concludes with what he considers the most eloquent response to those who speak of capitulation: “In recent days, Greece has upgraded its geostrategic depth.”
On the opposite side, another group of party figures watches the same developments with visible scepticism. “Adaptability to the Trump accelerator is necessary,” says another party figure, “but there is a difference between flexibility and manoeuvres that push us to lower the flag of International Law, our only constant in the face of any revisionist claim.” Dimitris Kairidis, parliamentary spokesperson of ND, stresses: “There is the America of Harvard and the America of Trump. Let us remember which America we must stand with. And I say this to colleagues of mine too.”
They are not turning a blind eye to the reshuffling underway, nor do they contest that the global stage has shifted definitively. They refuse, however, to interpret this new reality as a blank cheque to converge on the terms set by the new American leadership.
Theodoros Roussopoulos observes: “If Keir Starmer is not Winston Churchill, as Trump says, then we too should say that Trump is not Franklin Roosevelt.” He continues: “From the Vietnam War to the war in Iraq, History has shown that wars often begin with certainties and end with questions. If History repeats itself, perhaps one day historians will seek a new term to describe a protracted conflict in the Middle East analogous to Vietnam. One might call it, even allusively, ‘Trump-nam.'”
The Stance of Maximos and the Uncertainty
For Kyriakos Mitsotakis, managing the situation is not pursued through ruptures, but through a model of “shock absorption.”
At Maximos Mansion, the Prime Minister chooses not to overstate the depth of the divergences, confining the different schools of thought within the framework of “strategic flexibility.” “There are not two foreign policies, there is one that requires a multi-faceted approach” is the standard refrain regarding the two readings, with him presenting himself as an arbiter between realism and international legality. Meanwhile, Giorgos Gerapetritis at the Foreign Ministry and Nikos Dendias at the Defence Ministry maintain the necessary equilibrium.
The reality, however, points to a dangerous exercise on a tightrope. The government is balancing between two schools of thought: on one hand, cautious waiting, exemplified by “this is not the moment to comment on legality” in the Maduro case, and on the other, participation in Trump’s “Peace Council” for Gaza, while simultaneously setting as a goal the “control of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programme in order to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons,” always invoking “International Law.”
Yet however effective the manoeuvres may appear so far, they are not enough to defuse the underlying uncertainty running through the party.
The question hanging over the Aegean remains unyielding, as an experienced New Democracy figure frames it: “What will happen if the ‘peacemaker’ Trump decides to smooth out Greek-Turkish relations in his own real-estate way, by imposing a pre-decided settlement?”
