International arms deals involving Turkey inevitably make headlines in Greece. Every significant boost to the military strength of the eastern neighbor is perceived as a potential threat. Preserving a balance of power in the Aegean – and increasingly beyond – has long been a central and consistent goal of Greek foreign policy, especially since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974. Since then, arms deliveries to the region have shaped Athens’ relations with the United States like few other issues – and they are playing an increasingly prominent role in Greece’s dealings with other partners as well.

When I was working on my dissertation on Greek-Turkish relations in the mid-1980s – some forty years ago – the “7:10 ratio” in U.S. arms shipments to Greece and Turkey dominated the headlines. Probably every child in Greece knew this formula by heart; for successive Greek governments, it was a policy inscribed in stone. Today’s generation has become accustomed to different acronyms – no expert panel or field report on geostrategic challenges goes by without reference to F-16s and F-35s, often accompanied by a mention of the Russian S-400 air defense system.

Greek governments – and, along with them, a watchful and often anxious public – have always placed great importance on avoiding a disadvantage in the arms race with Turkey. The race is about both quantity and quality. Athens and Ankara share a dependence on foreign suppliers for the most advanced military technologies. Because Athens, for various reasons, cannot prevent the delivery of weapons to Turkey, it falls back – like a second line of defense – on demanding binding conditions: namely, that such weapons not be used against Greece.

Athens has also made such demands in response to reports that Turkey has expressed interest in acquiring Eurofighter jets – a weapons system co-produced by companies from Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Greece appealed directly to the governments of these four European countries, requesting that strict usage conditions be applied. Until recently, the German government had blocked the sale with a veto. But in a significant shift, the new German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has now signaled a green light.

This marks a turning point in German-Turkish relations and, at least indirectly, also affects German-Greek ties. In a recent commentary written for the readers of this news site, I examined Berlin’s new policy stance, citing German media reports indicating that Turkey would only be allowed to deploy the Eurofighters for NATO missions – a stipulation that would, by implication, exclude their use against Greece.

Following that publication, I received a number of responses and letters from Greek friends and colleagues that I wish to address here. A common thread running through all of them is skepticism. The dominant view is that such agreements or conditions are meaningless when it comes to Turkey – for the simple reason that President Erdoğan cannot be trusted.

This widespread mistrust gives weight to the following question: How can the suppliers – in this case, the European producers of the Eurofighter – guarantee that Ankara, despite any formal pledges, will not in the end deploy these aircraft against a NATO ally such as Greece?

This question must be counted among the most pressing challenges of recent Greek foreign policy. There is no simple answer. But let’s first consider how Athens, and others in comparable situations, have typically approached such dilemmas.

Political assurances and conditionalities are not unusual in the world of international arms sales. Many export deals include so-called end-use clauses or political constraints that restrict how and where the delivered weapons can be used. In this case, as noted, German approval appears to be tied to Ankara’s promise to use the Eurofighters strictly within NATO operations – a form of political conditionality meant to preclude deployment against Greece. The problem, however, is this: such clauses are often not legally binding. They rest on political understandings. And in a world increasingly shaped not by the rule of law but by the law of force, what value do such agreements really hold?

The logical consequence is this: any enforcement of such pledges must take place not through legal channels but through political means – via intelligence monitoring, diplomatic pressure, and, as a last resort, the threat of future export bans. The latter may in fact offer the most effective deterrent. These fighter jets – like submarines or missile defense systems – are complex technological platforms. They require maintenance and a steady supply of spare parts. This creates a dependence of the buyer on the supplier and gives the latter a degree of leverage.

Still, even under the most realistic assumptions, there is no ironclad guarantee that the buyer – in this case Turkey – will refrain from using the weapons (the Eurofighters) against the supplier’s wishes (in this case, against a NATO ally). A residual risk remains.

A sound political analysis must account for the motivations and interests of all parties. For the new German government, preserving the military balance between Greece and Turkey is only one factor in a broader equation. Chancellor Merz has made it explicitly clear that his overarching goal is to anchor Turkey more firmly in the West – to prevent a drift away from NATO by a strategically vital country. Within this logic, arms deals play a crucial role. They serve as instruments of cooperation and interdependence.

To promote peace between Greece and Turkey, Berlin and other Western governments are therefore not advocating for disarmament. Such considerations have little traction in a world where massive investments in weapons are being made on all fronts. Predictably, Athens has responded with its own new weapons programs. In the best-case scenario – for the defense industry – this means fresh orders and full order books. The well-known arms spiral is spinning faster once again in these uncertain times.

Back to where we started: the Eurofighter deal for Turkey. The Greek government responded cautiously to Germany’s policy shift. The strategic dilemma facing Athens – indeed, the lack of realistic alternatives – is encapsulated in the following assessment, which I will quote in full:

“Turkey is a large country with a strong defense industry. Anyone who believes that the sale of military equipment to Turkey can be blocked is seriously mistaken. That has never happened  –  and it never will. What is possible, however, is to raise awareness among our European partners of the need to establish conditions and safeguards: regarding the delivery, the potential use, and the future maintenance of these aircraft. And I am confident that we will succeed in this effort.”

These remarks were made by Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in an interview with a major Athens-based television station on the very day the German government’s green light for the Eurofighter sale to Ankara dominated the news cycle.

Dr. Ronald Meinardus is a senior research fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)