In the coming months, the Greek government will have to walk a political tightrope—balancing not only the fragile calm in Greek-Turkish relations but also its ties with Europe’s most influential powers.

Germany’s Foreign Minister was due in Athens last Monday, but the visit was postponed due to the Peace Summit organized by Donald Trump in Sharm El-Sheikh. Yet Berlin’s pressure on Athens remains firm: Greece, they argue, should soften its resistance to Turkey’s participation in the SAFE program—the Strategic Armament for Europe initiative, seen as the first major step toward European defense autonomy. And the Germans are not alone.

Pressure from Berlin and NATO

NATO’s Secretary-General Mark Rutte—recently appointed and formerly Prime Minister of the Netherlands—took up the baton in Copenhagen during the European Political Community Summit. His meeting with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis aimed to gauge Athens’ intentions.

There, Mitsotakis reiterated—reportedly for at least the fourth time since last summer—that Greece would not consent to Turkey’s access to European defense funds as long as Ankara maintains its casus belli (threat of war) against Greece. He also raised the issue of “grey zones,” areas of disputed sovereignty in the Aegean Sea claimed by Turkey.

For Athens, this stance has now become politically entrenched. Backtracking would be difficult, especially as the issue has entered Greece’s domestic political arena. The prime minister is expected to address it again in today’s parliamentary debate on foreign policy.

Brussels Responds

When questioned on Wednesday about Germany’s pressure on Greece, European Commission Defense spokesperson Thomas Renier confirmed that Turkey—along with South Korea—has indeed applied to join the SAFE initiative.

“The application will be reviewed by the Commission,” Renier said. “If it receives a positive assessment, it will be forwarded to the European Council. Should the Council approve the recommendation, bilateral negotiations for Turkey’s participation in SAFE could then begin.”

Renier stressed that “the European Commission shares the concerns of certain member states,” a clear reference to objections raised by Greece and Cyprus. He noted, however, that the SAFE regulation includes safeguards ensuring that no third country can act against the interests of any EU member state.

This refers to Article 16 of the SAFE regulation, adopted following strong lobbying from Athens. Although vague about what constitutes an “interest” or “action,” the article provides at least a minimal layer of protection for Greece.

Is Athens Cornered?

The real test, however, lies in whether Turkey will be required to sign a bilateral agreement with the EU—something that, according to Greece, would require unanimous approval from all 27 member states. This would effectively give Athens veto power.

Greece’s position is clear: unless Ankara officially withdraws its casus belli—a parliamentary decision issued in 1995 authorizing war if Greece extends its territorial waters in the Aegean beyond six nautical miles—Athens will block Turkey’s participation. Reversing that decades-old stance is politically unthinkable in Turkey, where it remains a matter of national pride.

That leaves Greece trapped between external pressure from its European partners and the geopolitical reality of an emboldened Turkey—now an indispensable player in the region and a crucial interlocutor for both Washington and Brussels.

Diplomatic Lines Hold Firm

When asked by To Vima whether recent developments in the Middle East and Turkey’s elevated diplomatic status might prompt a rethink of Greece’s position, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lana Ziokhou was unequivocal.

“Greece’s foreign policy is not dictated by others,” she said, reiterating that as long as unanimity is required and Turkey continues to threaten war, Athens will maintain its veto.

Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis was equally clear: “It is obvious that lifting the casus belli is a prerequisite for any discussion to proceed.”

Between Europe’s Giants and Ankara’s Shadow

Ultimately, Athens must maintain a delicate balance—protecting national interests while avoiding diplomatic isolation.
In Turkey, Greece’s objections have already dominated headlines, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressing familiar outrage over what Ankara views as the “internationalization” of bilateral disputes.

Meanwhile, Europe’s power core—particularly Berlin and Paris—considers Turkey’s participation in European defense cooperation almost a given. This presence, even if indirect, is already being secured through strategic partnerships, joint ventures, and acquisitions involving major defense firms such as Italy’s Leonardo and Piaggio, as well as bilateral agreements like those between Turkey and Spain.

Adding to the complexity, non-EU partners may access up to 15% of SAFE’s total funds without needing a formal agreement—a loophole that further complicates Greece’s stance.

For now, Athens remains on the wire—trying to keep its balance in a high-stakes diplomatic act that could shape the future of Europe’s defense order.