Turkey’s Defense Minister Yasar Guler, speaking yesterday from the headquarters of the Arda border unit on the Greek-Turkish border, said his country “will not accept faits accomplis in the Aegean, the Mediterranean and Cyprus,” and that “activities aimed at arming islands that should have non-military status are incompatible with good-neighborly relations, the spirit of the alliance and international law.”
He added that Turkey would not accept “maximalist initiatives,” a clear reference to Greece, Cyprus and Israel.
“It should be absolutely clear that we will not remain indifferent to any attempt that affects our sovereign rights, our security and our legitimate rights and interests in our seas,” Guler concluded.
The statement comes just days before Turkey plans to take a bill on maritime zones to the Turkish National Assembly. Whether the statements are a diversion from Turkey’s domestic political crisis or a decision already taken to create faits accomplis, tensions are rising both within the country and with neighbors.
Athens’ Response
Greece’s reaction through sources at the Ministry of National Defense was immediate.
“Greece exercises its sovereign rights with full commitment to International Law and does not accept revisionist approaches and arbitrary interpretations that attempt to turn unilateral readings into political faits accomplis,” the sources said.
They added, sending a message in all directions, that “the Hellenic Armed Forces continuously maintain a high level of operational readiness and deterrent power, consistently defending national sovereignty and national security.”
Guler’s statement came a few days after a court in Ankara removed the leader of the opposition CHP, Ozgur Ozel, from the party presidency over “irregularities” and appointed Kemal Kilicdaroglu in his place.
Police had earlier intervened violently at CHP headquarters in Ankara, at Kilicdaroglu’s request.
What Lies Behind Ankara’s “Omnibus Bill”
At the same time, leaks have begun appearing in Turkish media regarding the bill on maritime zones. Most notably, Hurriyet has reported that Ankara has carefully planned its next steps and that the bill will not be limited to what is already known.
“There are some chapters we already know, but beyond these it includes many deep strategies, which we will see and understand when it is approved and its articles are implemented,” wrote Hurriyet columnist Nedim Sener.
It is worth noting that since French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Greece and the Greece-Cyprus-Israel trilateral meeting, Turkey has gradually begun raising the tone, forcing even Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis to acknowledge that the “calm waters” have not been so calm lately.
At the recent Ideas Circle conference organized by Evangelos Venizelos, Gerapetritis said that “calm waters do not mean inaction.” A few days ago, speaking in Parliament, he stressed that “we will not tolerate any fait accompli whatsoever.” Earlier, on May 18, he had acknowledged that “regardless of the fact that it would be a unilateral action and would have no effect on international law, if there is an attempt it is obvious that tension will be created.”
Athens’ Strategy Against Turkish Revisionism
As To Vima reported on May 25, “it must be recalled that four EEZ delimitation agreements dominate the Eastern Mediterranean, based on what is provided for under the Law of the Sea. These are the agreements between Cyprus and Israel, Cyprus and Egypt, Greece and Egypt, and Israel and Lebanon. In short, while the coastal states of the region are moving according to the compass of international legality, Turkey is moving in the opposite direction.”
Israel also did not escape yesterday’s broad and, as it appears, well-planned Turkish provocativeness. In his message for the Feast of Sacrifice — Eid al-Adha — outside the Camlica Grand Mosque in Istanbul, Erdogan said: “May God ensure that this tyrant called Netanyahu,” referring to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, “gets the lesson he deserves before the Muslim world.”
Sources from Turkey suggest that the maritime zones bill “will give Turkey new powers and jurisdictions within the framework of the ‘Blue Homeland,’” with Ankara arguing that the text has been drafted on the basis of international law.
It should be noted, however, that Turkey has not signed the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, and its definition of “international law” is in many cases based on its own interpretation and interests, as defined by Ankara at different times.
Erdogan appears to have been wavering recently, taking decisions that suggest irritation. The most notable was the decision to close Istanbul’s internationally recognized Bilgi University- perhaps the country’s best educational institution- and then reverse the decision after the reactions it provoked.
In any case, whether today’s statements by the Turkish defense minister sound particularly and unusually threatening because of a combination of irritation over Ankara’s regional isolation, the acute political crisis caused by developments in the opposition CHP, and the high inflation that has pushed Turkish households to their limits, remains to be seen.
However, incidents such as the harassment a few weeks ago of the cable-laying vessel Ocean Link in the sea area between Kos and Astypalaia by a Turkish missile boat, with the intervention of the frigate Andrias, as well as the fact that after almost three years Turkish aircraft are not only violating Greece’s FIR and airspace but, in some cases- though not all, for now- are also armed, carry their own significance.
The assessment of experienced military circles and analysts is that the sharp rhetoric has less- though not nothing- to do with Turkey’s domestic situation and more to do with the neighboring country’s effort to break up Greece’s trilateral alliance with Cyprus and Israel. At the same time, with what could be described as an “omnibus bill,” Ankara appears to be seeking to present its own version of how it understands the full range of Greek-Turkish disputes.
Until the bill is submitted to the Turkish National Assembly, information will continue to be confused and murky. But Greece’s readiness to counter any reference- whether or not it concerns Turkey’s internal affairs, which is irrelevant- that is not in line with international law is expected to be strong.
At the same time, Greece is expected to focus on mobilizing allies within the European Union to secure international support against possible Turkish revisionism, which appears increasingly likely.
