Kovalchuk, who will participate in the Delphi Economic Forum XI in April (22-25), emphasizes that leaving Europe on the sidelines would be a “big mistake,” as no decisions about European security should be made without Europe itself. She underscores that Ukraine’s struggle is both a battlefield and a negotiation table effort, where enduring peace must be built on resilient defense, collective security, and the rule of law.

With new Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy grid just hours before peace talks in Geneva, how do you interpret Moscow’s strategy — negotiation or escalation?

At the moment, the trilateral negotiations in Geneva have concluded, and it’s clear they are divided into two tracks: military-technical and political. In Geneva, negotiators spent two days on a range of issues, but there was no meaningful political breakthrough. Key disputes such as territorial control and security guarantees remained unresolved, and both sides described the discussions as difficult.

Now we may see more clearly what kind of a signal Russia sends on a political track when striking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure during a period of extreme cold. This is hardly a signal of readiness to de-escalate. Next, Vladimir Medinsky returned as the head of the Russian negotiating team. He last led talks in early 2022, when Moscow’s demands centered on Ukraine’s so-called “demilitarization.” Today, Russia’s political position appears largely unchanged – proposals for “demilitarized zones” effectively amount to demanding Ukrainian troop withdrawals from territories under Kyiv’s control.

With such a negotiating stance, the strategy seems clear: remain engaged in talks while simultaneously increasing pressure on Ukraine’s civilian resilience and pushing maximalist demands. Strikes on critical infrastructure serve as leverage, aimed at weakening societal endurance rather than creating conditions for compromise. We have seen this pattern before: temporary pauses in attacks were followed by renewed strikes. Most recently, the early-February “energy cease-fire” lasted only a few days before being broken during extreme cold, with temperatures up to -28°C.

So today the negotiations are less about whether the war can technically be stopped -that part is increasingly clear – and more about whether there is genuine political will to stop it. And for now, the evidence on the ground suggests that escalation is being used as leverage rather than as a step toward peace.

Do you believe the upcoming U.S.-mediated Geneva talks can produce any meaningful progress when Moscow is demanding the impossible?

The dynamics of the trilateral talks remain complex, and your formulation, “impossible demands”, is very accurate. The main point of contention continues to be territory: Russia’s long-standing aim of demilitarizing Ukraine, expressed since the start of the war, is now reflected in Geneva in the renewed insistence on the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions at least.

As President Zelenskyy has said, this is not just about territory, but about people, historical memory, and the country’s strategy for defense. This is precisely why Ukraine cannot agree to any arrangement that risks expanding Russian occupation under the guise of a cease-fire. Ukraine needs peace but it cannot accept capitulation disguised as a frozen conflict. That is why negotiations must continue. We value the fact that the peace talks have reached this level under the mediation of the United States. At the same time, preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and safeguarding the rights and freedoms of Ukrainians must remain the guiding principle for any path toward a lasting peace. This requires the engagement of all our partners, including Europe, to ensure effective coordination of efforts.

President Zelenskyy has called for legally binding U.S. security guarantees of 20 years before any peace deal. Is that realistic, and what would it mean for Ukraine’s sovereignty?

It is important to understand that the discussion is not limited to 20 years. We have heard figures of 30 or even 50 years, and this reflects the broader logic: Ukraine needs security that matches the scale and duration of its recovery.

A 15-year horizon would likely be insufficient for a country rebuilding after the largest war in Europe since World War II. The Ukrainian economy remains severely constrained by destroyed infrastructure — from railways and energy generation to logistics facilities and vast areas requiring demining. Entire sectors, such as metallurgy, which once accounted for a significant share of exports, require deep restructuring. This recovery will be both long-term and heavily dependent on foreign investment.

Ukraine has enormous potential for foreign investment across several sectors, including green energy, IT, agribusiness, and the localization of manufacturing, We have done significant work to become competitive in these areas. At the same time, some things simply don’t depend on us, above all the external guarantees of peace. And this is no longer only about Ukrainians – security guarantees now also need to be sufficiently credible for Western investors. That is why Ukraine is being fully transparent and consistent in its call for a longer horizon in these negotiations.

So, to answer directly: yes, it is realistic. The United States is already offering unprecedented security guarantees, with the intention of formalizing them through Congress and embedding in U.S. law – something that has not been done before. Ukraine is engaging constructively in accelerated negotiations led by the United States and is making significant compromises in the broader interest of the democratic world. In such conditions, credible guarantees of U.S. commitment become essential.

Ukraine that has not fully recovered would remain vulnerable to renewed aggression from Russia, especially given that the political and societal drivers of the war are unlikely to disappear within a single generation. So, this is not a debate about 20 years alone, but about the full horizon of Ukraine’s recovery and the ability to deter and withstand Russian aggression independently.

Zelenskyy also warned that Europe’s near absence from peace negotiations is a “big mistake.” What should Europe’s role be alongside the U.S. in a peace process?

Leaving Europe on the margins would indeed be a “big mistake” for one simple reason: no decisions about Europe’s security should be made without Europe itself. Across the continent, countries have been targeted by Russia’s hybrid tactics, including disruptions to energy and telecom networks, cyber intrusions, disinformation campaigns, and occasional attacks on civilian sites. Ukraine’s security is inseparable from the security of the continent, which is why European efforts focus on addressing these threats structurally, not just militarily.

As the trajectory of the peace talks shows, despite nearly a year of active negotiations, Europeans have not been directly involved in the core format, largely due to Russia’s resistance while it continues its hybrid pressure on European states. At the same time, Europe’s approach is future-oriented, aiming not only to end the war but also to reinforce the region’s security and enhance Ukraine’s capacity to defend itself. This is reflected in the 24-point European peace plan, which provides for Ukraine’s EU accession and European observers on-site, reinforcing Ukraine’s structures against potential threats.

While direct European presence at the main negotiating table would be fair given its role and influence, practical considerations mean that, alongside our desire, we may focus on constant information sharing and deep coordination. Physical presence at every stage is not strictly necessary. However, the presence of delegations from 4 European countries in Geneva during the 3rd round of talks demonstrates very positive trends in this regard.

At the same time, there are multiple ways to involve Europe through parallel platforms and interaction formats aligned with the main negotiation clusters, with outcomes subsequently fed into the core negotiating table. We remain highly flexible in how this is done, as long as the main objective is achieved. Europe is not being sidelined when it comes to matters that concern it.

Some analysts say the peace push under Trump privileges quick negotiation over long-term security. What are the risks of that approach for Ukraine?

Unfortunately, a fast peace does not necessarily mean a just or lasting one. Territorial issues clearly remain at the forefront of these trilateral negotiations, which puts other critical matters at risk of being left unresolved. Even on the question of territory, the long-term impact of any concessions is not fully understood, and a limited Russian presence on Ukrainian land, actively promoted to Ukraine, could still create serious security risks.

Beyond territorial matters, Ukraine must safeguard its people – prisoners of war, kidnapped children, and residents of cities heavily damaged or destroyed by the war. The world must also give proper attention to holding perpetrators of war crimes accountable. Moreover, there are numerous practical aspects that rarely come up during the negotiations, such as sanctions enforcement, reparations, countering Russian disinformation campaigns and sabotage, regulating Russian military presence in other countries, and a wide range of additional issues.

A separate aspect is ensuring that Ukrainians feel genuinely secure: guarantees must be formulated clearly and comprehensively to meet a basic human need – the confidence that one will be safe tomorrow, next month, year, or even a decade from now. Such complex guarantees inevitably require time to project into the future. Defining national priorities in this context and coordinating a broad range of multilateral issues is a lengthy process, and these considerations inevitably fall outside the scope of rapid negotiations.

As can be seen, many of these aspects have already been discussed in other parts of the interview. This highlights the fact that ending the war is not just about stopping the fighting, but a comprehensive set of actions affect both the present and the future of the entire world. We need to recognize that bypassing these “secondary territorial” issues would be a major victory for the Russian regime and a serious risk for a world that envisions itself as peaceful.

Ukraine’s case at the Munich Security Conference emphasized that territorial concessions won’t bring peace — drawing parallels to pre-World War II appeasement.  What message should Kyiv want the world to take from Munich?

Following the tone of this year’s address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, it is worth remaining optimistic. Among the many takeaways, the most important signal for Ukraine is a now widely accepted understanding: Ukraine’s security is linked to the broader security of Europe and the world.

At the same time, these reflections inevitably lead to a more sobering conclusion. Despite this shared recognition, Munich Security Conference also revealed a certain uncertainty – a lack of full coordination and confidence about the future. Discussions ranged from NATO reform and defense budgets to cognitive warfare and the need to strengthen transatlantic cooperation. Across speeches, there was a clear sense that every country and institution must rethink and reshape its role to meet the realities of a world transformed by Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Against this backdrop, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen even referenced Article 42.7, the EU’s mutual assistance clause, underscoring that member states are obliged to support one another “by all the means in their power” in the event of armed aggression. In this context, arguments that Ukraine should simply concede territory to end the war lose any remaining logic: the conflict has already reshaped the global order so profoundly that adaptation, not accommodation, is now the only path forward.

Seen in this light, the growing calls for a comprehensive peace sounded notably stronger in Munich. The message was clear: Ukraine needs real, durable security guarantees — robust enough to make any future aggression impossible. A concrete EU accession timeline, long-term U.S. security commitments, and the inviolability of Ukraine’s sovereignty and borders are all integral parts of this message, which the world now seems to be hearing more clearly.

As German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated at the opening, the post–World War II world order “no longer exists.” And just across from the conference venue at Bayerischer Hof, the entrance to the Ukrainian House was marked by a large neon installation reading “Change or Die.” In many ways, that stark phrase may be the central lesson the Western world should take from this year’s Munich gathering. After all, Ukraine was not the only actor to leave Munich with a clear message.

Kyiv hopes for a clear date for EU accession — possibly as early as 2027. How important is that political signal for Ukraine’s resilience and diplomatic leverage?

Under the current rules, formal EU accession by 2027 is not technically possible. However, at the Ukrainian Lunch in Munich – organized by the Yalta European Strategy in partnership with the Victor Pinchuk Foundation – European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos made a notable statement: discussions are already underway to explore possible mechanisms that could make accession around 2027 feasible. Proposed approaches include partial membership or a two-stage system, potentially allowing Ukraine to take its seat in the EU before completing all required reforms.

This in itself is a significant signal that Europe is willing to respond to the challenges of a changing era. EU accession is a strategic priority for Ukraine, enshrined in its constitution, rooted in the history of its struggle, and reflected in public consciousness, with support steadily rising to 83% of the population. Aligning Ukraine’s internal clusters with EU requirements during an ongoing full-scale war is an immense effort, which is why no party can afford to lose time or neglect the technical work Ukraine is undertaking. This formal accession process effectively overcomes years of Russian resistance to Ukraine’s European choice – it is a testament to the strength of both Ukraine and Europe.

Moreover, a fixed EU accession date is also a security guarantee for Ukraine, forming part of the ongoing negotiation process. On one hand, it strengthens Ukraine’s sovereignty, boosting economic, political, and diplomatic independence, with Europe remaining a consistent partner committed to isolating Russia internationally and compelling it toward not just peace, but a just peace.

On the other hand, it enhances Europe’s own agency: as the largest provider of aid to Ukraine, with vast resources, the continent has yet to have a real opportunity to defend its interests at the negotiating table. Accordingly, the future European security order will largely be shaped without full European involvement unless sufficient political will exists to reform the system – an effort that simultaneously strengthens both Ukraine and Europe.

With nearly four years of war, is Ukraine now fighting a war or negotiating a peace that could reshape Europe’s security order?

Both. Peace is not something that simply falls into place — it is earned on the battlefield every day. The reason negotiations today do not amount to capitulation is because Russia has failed to break Ukraine’s resistance.

In this sense, negotiations are about more than a ceasefire. They are about embedding durable structures that prevent future conflicts: ensuring that any country cannot be coerced through military force, reinforcing collective defense mechanisms, and creating clear rules for security guarantees. A strong, secure Ukraine becomes a cornerstone for a Europe that can resist aggression, respond collectively, and protect the values of sovereignty and rule of law. It’s important for our partners to understand that fighting and negotiating are not mutually exclusive. Without Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, any negotiation process could quickly be reduced to coercion.