Amid the geopolitical vortex caused by Donald Trump’s moves to reorganize the Western security system, with the United States relinquishing its role as the centripetal force of the liberal world and even laying claim to the annexation of NATO territory, Athens is setting as its absolute priority the preservation of calm in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.
And while final consultations are under way regarding the holding of the Supreme Cooperation Council (SCC) in Ankara—with the date expected to be announced, barring unforeseen developments, within the week—in the Greek capital the view has now become widespread that the “Trump 2.0 era” calls for convergence.
“An existential necessity”
“In the current context of full asymmetry, the operation of direct channels of communication is not simply necessary; it is an existential issue,” a senior diplomatic source tells To Vima. In this way, the concern prevailing in Athens is reflected—not only regarding a possible return to times of tension, with American deterrence no longer taken for granted, but also regarding rumored external intervention aimed at settling the issues that periodically place Greece and Turkey on a collision course.
“We are in the midst of a global upheaval; consider that there are even talks between Russians and Ukrainians—it is impossible not to be talking to the Turks,” adds a New Democracy MP with direct access to the Maximos Mansion, noting that “the calm of recent years is an important gain. We want it to be preserved.”
A former minister with experience in international relations assesses that, especially as regards Greek–Turkish relations, the country is in a difficult position, mainly because it is called upon to balance between Europe and the United States: “Ankara is clearly leaning toward Washington, while Athens cannot distance itself from the European core. On issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights, Erdoğan thinks similarly to Trump; therefore Greece must be particularly cautious in its choices,” he adds.
Moreover, Turkey’s willingness to participate in Trump’s controversial Peace Council brings the two sides even closer. According to this approach, therefore, the need to keep dialogue with Ankara active becomes even more pressing, while the convening of the SCC is an opportunity to convey the image—toward any interested party—that Athens and Ankara are demonstrating in practice a willingness to reach understanding.
Territorial waters
On the other hand, however, a Greek diplomat who has served for many years in Turkey considers the insistence on the Mitsotakis–Erdoğan summit meeting to be mistaken. “There has been pressure for some time for the Greek prime minister to travel to Ankara, even though a constructive agenda is essentially lacking,” he says, warning that “Athens could find itself taken by surprise if the Turks demand, for example, an acceleration of dialogue on the Aegean.”
It is recalled that recently Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, focused on the “Aegean problem,” as he called it, while in another intervention months ago he dwelled specifically on the issue of territorial waters, estimating that the difference between 6 nautical miles—Ankara’s position—and 12—an inalienable right of Athens—could be settled, obviously following mutual compromises.
These specific remarks by Mr. Fidan have long been under the microscope of Greek diplomacy, despite the fact that Athens’ official position remains unchanged: “Territorial waters are a matter of national sovereignty, which will never be subject to dialogue,” the senior diplomatic source reiterates, while noting, however, that “Turkey’s positions and everything that has been recorded over time (among them the discussion of graduated territorial waters) are taken into account.”
According to the same source, Fidan’s stance cannot but be considered an “opening, as it limits the scope of the revisionist agenda,” a point which of course does not mean that the range of Turkish claims will be withdrawn from the table. In Athens, they do indeed discern a willingness on Ankara’s part to discuss major issues, but they add that “willingness will turn into substance only if the dialogue takes place on our own terms: we speak only about the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the continental shelf.”
As Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis has repeatedly stated, however, the conditions are not currently met, as Turkey—despite what Fidan says—does not accept the Greek position that there is only one dispute.
On the other hand, as experienced interlocutors of To Vima observe, the issues in the Aegean are at the very least interlinked (for example, the correlation between territorial waters and national airspace), but they originate from the unfounded Turkish theory of “grey zones.” “If the ‘grey zones’ theory is not withdrawn, how can maritime zones be delimited? From where does the drawing of territorial waters begin?” they ask, essentially setting Ankara’s retreat from this position as a prerequisite—an eventuality that appears unlikely, even in the long term.
Balancing acts
Given, therefore, Turkey’s intentions, Athens is called upon to maintain a delicate balance: to appear open to dialogue, even on the substance of the legal–diplomatic issues that underlie the gap and tensions in the Aegean, but exclusively on its own terms—that is, the provisions of the Law of the Sea. As is evident, however, this stance may be perceived internationally as an inability on the part of Greece to demonstrate flexibility, while it should be considered certain that in the event of deadlock Ankara will automatically shift the responsibility onto Greece. It is noted that Mr. Fidan once again attributed Athens’ hesitations to the terms of its internal political game.
In the Greek capital it is also well known that the position of a single dispute is difficult to grasp in Europe and Washington, especially since it traps dialogue within very narrow limits. Nevertheless, a source close to Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ diplomatic team assures that “the Greek delegation in Ankara will not fall into any ‘trap.’” Another stake is the management—privately, but mainly in the joint statements following the Supreme Cooperation Council—of issues that have surfaced in recent months, rekindling tension between Greece and Turkey: among them the close Athens–Tel Aviv relations, the declared intention to prevent Turkey’s participation in the first step of the European defense industry project, as well as the submission of the Maritime Spatial Planning framework, which depicts the outermost limits of the Greek continental shelf.
Of particular interest is also whether the Prime Minister will raise with Tayyip Erdoğan the issue of withdrawing the threat of war (casus belli), as he has committed to do, or whether he will prefer to keep a low profile, as has happened in previous public appearances of the two leaders. In any case, nothing in the Greek–Turkish dialogue resembles the momentum that existed after the re-election of the Greek prime minister and the Turkish president in mid-2023. With the priorities of the two sides being entirely different, domestically and internationally, recent references to a “historic opportunity” to resolve long-standing bilateral problems seem rather out of step with reality.
