Only days after Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis told the Vima Conference that conditions are “mature” for holding the next Greece–Turkey High-Level Cooperation Council during the first quarter of 2026, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has brought Ankara’s long-standing revisionist positions back to the forefront—on the Aegean, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Cyprus issue, and the Muslim minority in Thrace (a region in northeastern Greece).
Speaking before the Turkish Grand National Assembly during the debate on the Foreign Ministry budget, Fidan made it effectively clear that Ankara has no intention of abandoning its full list of claims in the Aegean. He also left no doubt that Turkey will never enter a dialogue focused solely on the single issue Athens recognizes: the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf.
Ankara’s Revisionist Logic
According to Turkey—a position developed gradually since 1973—the Aegean contains a series of interconnected disputes that must be resolved as a package: starting with territorial waters, extending to national airspace, the FIR (Flight Information Region), search-and-rescue zones, and ultimately sovereignty issues. In recent years Ankara has also linked these claims to its demand for the demilitarization of Greek islands.
In line with this revisionist narrative, Turkey argues that Greek islands do not have full sovereign rights, except for territorial waters up to six nautical miles. It also claims that the Turkish continental shelf should be calculated from the mainland coasts of both countries—effectively cutting the Aegean in half.
Athens, unsurprisingly, rejects these positions outright, reiterating that the only dispute between the two countries is the delimitation of maritime zones. Diplomatic sources in Greece referred on Monday to “revisionist positions and proposals,” stressing that they are entirely unacceptable.fid
Dialogue—But Not Convergence
What is striking is that both Fidan and diplomatic sources in Athens insist they want the dialogue to continue, based on principles of international law. Yet the two sides sound more like they are delivering parallel monologues than seriously exploring any prospects of convergence on key legal and diplomatic issues.
Political consultations have effectively been frozen for months—at least since November 2024—following the public admission by both Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis and Fidan that there is no shared framework of understanding. Even if the two sides manage to settle on a date for the next round, possibly within the first weeks of January, discussions are expected to focus only on areas such as cooperation on migration and civil protection.
Within this limited framework, Athens reiterates—something Mitsotakis emphasized during his recent dialogue with journalist Giannis Pretenteris—that although the core disputes may be nearly impossible to bridge, communication channels must remain open to prevent the escalation of day-to-day crises.
Cyprus: A Cornerstone of Turkey’s Strategy
In his speech, Fidan highlighted Cyprus as an “inseparable part” of Turkey’s strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. His comments come as the personal envoy of the UN Secretary-General is conducting meetings on the island—first with President of the Republic of Cyprus Nikos Christodoulides, then with newly elected Turkish-Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman. A trilateral meeting is scheduled for Thursday, 11 December, at the end of which a timeline may be announced for the next informal five-party meeting, involving Greece, Turkey and the UK, possibly in January.
While Fidan did not explicitly mention a two-state solution—a frequent demand of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—he insisted on the need for the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (the breakaway entity in the island’s occupied north, recognized only by Turkey) to “take its rightful place in the international community” and for the “inhumane embargo” against Turkish Cypriots to be lifted.
Escalating Rhetoric
Since Erhürman’s election, Ankara has slightly toned down its explicit references to partition, instead speaking of the need to recognize the “realities on the island” and the “sovereign rights” of Turkish Cypriots across the territory and EEZ of Cyprus. Turkish media, however, continue to adopt a hard line, directly accusing Cyprus, Israel and Greece of seeking to arm the Republic of Cyprus as part of a strategy to encircle Turkish interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Tensions escalated further after Cyprus and Lebanon signed their EEZ agreement. Commenting on the deal yesterday, AKP spokesperson Ömer Çelik—fully aligned with Erdoğan—declared: “Any approach that attempts to ignore the rights of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ will have no future here. Let that be clear.”
“Steps of Reciprocity” and the Minority in Thrace
Fidan also raised the issue of a “Turkish minority” in Thrace, portraying Ankara as the protector of the Muslim population there—while speaking, ironically, of “reciprocity” in comparison with the diminishing Greek minority in Istanbul. Athens replies—as defined in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne—that the minority in Thrace is religious, not ethnic.
Why the Tensions Are Unlikely to Escalate
Despite the sharper rhetoric, another major spiral of Greek-Turkish tensions is not expected at this stage. Several sensitive issues remain pending:
– the High-Level Cooperation Council
– the next five-party meeting on Cyprus
– Turkey’s potential role in Europe’s defence-autonomy initiatives
Moreover, the United States currently signals a clear preference for de-escalation and avoidance of new flashpoints.
For now, the longstanding disputes remain exactly where they have been for decades—deep, complex, and unresolved—while both sides insist on dialogue, even if they appear to be speaking past each other.
