In the span of a week, the Eastern Mediterranean returned to the center of Washington’s energy diplomacy.
First came the East Mediterranean Gas Forum in Washington. Then came Houston, the energy capital of the United States, where Greece, Cyprus, Israel and the United States brought the 3+1 framework back to the foreground with the launch of the East Med Energy Center.
The format, created during President Trump’s first administration but left with little substantive activity under President Biden, is regaining political momentum in a region where energy policy now touches security policy almost immediately.
The meetings in Washington and Houston showed that officials are trying to widen the circle of countries, institutions and companies with a stake in the new energy planning, so the effort does not rest only on a narrow diplomatic understanding.
Just as important is the insistence on rules that investors and governments can rely on, without which major investments and long-term energy agreements cannot stand.
That is where Athens and Washington now appear aligned.
When Chris Wright, the U.S. energy secretary, said in Houston that “commerce suppresses conflict,” he was describing the logic behind Washington’s effort to rebuild its energy strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is a strategy built on stable rules, economic predictability and infrastructure that connects allies.
Stavros Papastavrou, Greece’s minister of environment and energy, put the point more bluntly. Speaking to To Vima after the meeting, he said a new energy architecture was taking shape in the Eastern Mediterranean, one built to limit unilateral moves and revisionist claims.
Turkey’s absence was not incidental. Despite its size and geography, Ankara remains outside these initiatives, not because of a formal exclusion, but because its conduct has not aligned with the rules those initiatives are meant to uphold.
The Return of 3+1
Behind the public statements in Houston, the 3+1 meeting carried a clear political signal: the format is being put back to work as a channel for energy policy and regional strategy at a moment of heightened instability in the wider region.
Mr. Wright repeated the central American line that commerce can suppress conflict. He also gave particular weight to the role of Kimberly Guilfoyle, the U.S. ambassador to Greece, describing her as an important driver of that idea.
Ms. Guilfoyle, according to people familiar with the meeting, argued that the United States had been “the plus one from day one,” a phrase meant to signal that Washington sees itself as part of the format’s original design.
The American side also acknowledged the role of the Greek delegation. Mr. Wright praised Greek initiatives and, in a lighter moment, remarked that “everything comes from Greece.” Joshua Volz, the U.S. special envoy for energy integration, emphasized what he called the consistency of the commitment inside the 3+1 framework.
Houston, he said, was not the end of the road. The format met in November and again in June. The next meeting is expected to be set for Israel, extending the effort to turn the relaunch into a continuing process rather than a single diplomatic event.
The Cable that Tests the Rules
The test case is the Great Sea Interconnector, a planned electricity link connecting Greece, Cyprus and Israel and one of the region’s most politically sensitive energy projects.
The Great Sea Interconnector is more than a cable. For Cyprus, it is a potential way out of energy isolation. For Greece, Cyprus and Israel, it is a test of whether regional connectivity can survive political pressure.
For Washington, the cable is an early test of whether its preferred regional order can survive pressure from Turkey.
Asked by To Vima and RIK about Turkish actions aimed at undermining the project, Mr. Wright expressed political support without turning his answer into a direct confrontation with Ankara.
“The United States absolutely wants to see more energy infrastructure built around the world, and particularly among our friends and allies,” he said. “Of course, we are supporting and are interested in that project.”
He added that Washington hoped for “an amicable resolution” so that nothing would stand in the way of building energy infrastructure.
The answer reflected both the value and the limits of American support. Washington is backing the project politically, but it is not yet turning the issue into an open public clash with Turkey.
For Nicosia, the matter is more complicated. Cyprus has backed the interconnection in its talks with Washington. But it is also being asked to carry the largest financial burden for its implementation. For that reason, it is seeking long term assurances that the project will not again face Turkish interference or obstruction.
In that context, according to people familiar with the discussions, ways are being examined for the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to participate in the project, in order to give it a stronger American geopolitical stake.
In practical terms, the Great Sea Interconnector has become the first real test of this logic. If the Eastern Mediterranean is to function as a region of energy cooperation, critical infrastructure cannot remain hostage to unilateral actions and geopolitical pressure.
The Houston Launch of the EMEC
The Houston meeting also gave the East Med Energy Center (EMEC) the political visibility it had lacked for years.
Authorized by Congress in the 2019 EastMed Act, the center was envisioned as a way to bring together universities, private companies and offshore energy expertise for work on energy innovation, engineering, water science, technology transfer and geopolitical analysis.
But the law created an opening, not a finished institution. It said the secretary of energy, in consultation with the secretary of state, “may establish” the center, leaving the funding and implementation to later decisions.
That is why the Houston launch mattered. It appeared to be the implementation of a provision that had been sitting in law for years, and it gave the 3+1 relaunch an institutional home.
The question now is whether EMEC can become more than a Washington backed concept, turning a strong geopolitical rationale into a record of execution.
