The tragic train accident, the modern national tragedy for most—the Tempi disaster of February 28, 2023—which cost the lives of 57 fellow citizens, shook Greek society, provoking waves of outrage, anger, and indignation. What followed, particularly the atmosphere of cover-up and the climate of denial of responsibility, placed the ruling New Democracy party in an extremely difficult position. At the time, public opinion surveys recorded a significant drop in their support, in some cases even below 30%.

Almost three months later, specifically on May 21, 2023, the results of the national elections did not confirm the polling predictions. New Democracy’s percentages not only did not fall below 30% but soared to levels above 40%, a figure confirmed one month later in the second elections held on June 25.

Political analysts and scholars concluded at the time that the waves of anger and outrage expressed in the preceding months were overshadowed by feelings of fear and concern for the future, which ultimately prevailed, giving a double victory to a panicked Kyriakos Mitsotakis. It was the bad experiences from the handling of the major financial crisis that ultimately prevailed and offered the double victory to the liberal New Democracy.

The Collapse of Trust

Two and a half years later, after the disappointing European elections for New Democracy in June 2024—where its share fell from 40.56% in the second national elections of 2023 to just 28.31%—a similar climate of distrust, skepticism, and deep anger over wasted opportunities and dashed hopes seems to dominate. On the surface, expectations have been dampened, trust has collapsed, and dissatisfaction is at its peak. Since then, the polling performance of the governing party and the Prime Minister has remained consistently poor.

The only brief recovery occurred after agreements with the U.S. to promote American shale gas in Europe, but surveys indicate that this boost may not be sustainable. A series of events and conditions—such as scattered agricultural blockades across the country, the expanding wave of demands from multiple professional groups, and citizens’ perceptions of so-called subjective poverty affecting most of the population—create the impression that the Mitsotakis government barely survives because the opposition is fragmented and lacks a convincing plan for the future.

But is this really the case, or are we once again living in a polling illusion? Many believe that actual economic conditions are very different from those described. They argue that for a significant portion of the population, incomes have grown faster than inflation, employment opportunities have expanded, and their bargaining power is increasing under the current adverse demographic conditions affecting Greece.

Income Inequality and Social Reality

Recently, Tasos Giannitsis, a former minister under Costas Simitis, attempted to compare income growth between 2017 and 2022, under rising inflationary pressures, and to position it between governmental self-satisfaction and opposition nihilism. He concluded that reality is not the same for everyone.

From Giannitsis’s research, which is based on the sum of declared incomes from 2017—the year he considers the start of the recovery period—through 2022, it appears that the 11.9% increase in annual incomes up to €20,000 only covered cumulative inflation of about 11.5%, without reflecting the 10% real increase in GDP. The next group, with incomes from €20,000 to €200,000, covered both inflation and GDP growth and additionally gained 25% in income—double the rate of inflation and economic growth. The top group, with incomes above €200,000, soared to hyper-levels, as the former labor minister emphasizes.

Giannitsis describes this phenomenon as “income asymmetry” and notes that when, in a society that has undergone a cataclysmic crisis, the incomes, rewards, and expectations of the vast majority of citizens move at such uneven rates, there is a problem. This problem worsens if some of these incomes result from corruption, the black economy, or if there is a strong sense of injustice.

It is worth noting that in 2024, according to the Independent Authority for Public Revenue, total declared incomes increased by 15% compared to 2022, exceeding €106 billion—a record level in Greek tax history. All indicators also show that this record will be surpassed by 2025 incomes. Yet, 65.6% of taxpayers declared annual incomes below €10,000, and 87.22% below €20,000. Only 11.3% reported incomes between €20,000 and €50,000, and just 1.53% over €50,000.

These income figures, to the extent they reflect reality, confirm Giannitsis’s “income asymmetries” and help explain the “swamp of pessimism” in which Greek society finds itself.

Reading Greek Society

However, many insist that the cycle of poverty in Greece is overestimated, and that the broader property situation and persistent consumption suggest otherwise. They argue that 80% of the population does not live in poverty, while only 20% prospers. Consequently, many opposition parties remain stagnant at around 10% support, competing for the so-called majority in the broad poverty zone while leaving the rest to Mitsotakis. They consider this a strategic mistake, emphasizing that no political force in Greece has ever gained power without first understanding Greek society and convincing the middle-income segments that it can ensure national progress and citizens’ prosperity.

They also note that memories of the previous economic collapse remain fresh and contribute to the continued dominance of neo-conservatism and fear among Greeks, worried about losing even the little they have.

Thus, Greece is heading into the fully political year of 2026, during which dilemmas will be tested, old and new faces evaluated, and party balances and actual influence within society revealed—the factors that will ultimately determine the results of the national elections, which, it seems, may even take place before spring 2027.