An editor and specialist writer on European politics, history, and economic affairs—and former bureau chief for the Financial Times in Frankfurt, Rome and Brussels—Barber draws on decades of experience across Europe to describe how shrinking public services, fiscal pressures following the 2008 financial crisis, the pandemic, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have fueled public frustration. This erosion of state capacity, he suggests, has contributed to growing discontent over living standards, national identity and immigration, creating opportunities for populist figures such as Marine Le Pen.

You cover European and U.S. politics. What do you see as the most significant challenge to liberal democracy today: economic pressure, geopolitical rivalry, domestic polarization? Trump?

I think the question of domestic polarization is very important, especially because if the Europeans’ response—and I think it’s the right one—is indeed to try and move closer together in response to the change in American behavior, the polarization in every country could make that a lot harder than people think. A good example here would be France, which is facing a presidential election in the near future which is sure to be highly divisive. There might even be a problem with Germany, too, for the same reason. And then you have one or two countries in Central and Eastern Europe where it would be difficult. Which means that, although it would clearly be desirable for Europe as a whole to act more collectively and autonomously, I don’t think that path is going to prove an easy one.

The second challenge you mention is the state of the overall European economy. One of the problems there is that, over the last quarter of a century or so, the issue of generally slow growth has acquired an extra dimension: namely, quite large public debts. Though this problem is less acute in Germany. There is scope for fiscal policy to expand defense spending and generally make Europe more robust. But there is not much space to do this in countries like France or Italy. So, while it’s a nice idea–we’d all like to see the nations of Europe as a whole moving together at the same pace, rendering themselves more autonomous–there are economic factors that make it difficult, because the level of debt and the scope for fiscal policy to act as an accelerator differs from country to country.

Why didn’t we predict any of this? I mean, Brexit should have been a warning. The people that vote for the AfD in Germany and Le Pen in France aren’t crazy, they just feel unheard. Is that what all the liberal democrats, if that’s the right term for them, didn’t understand? What Macron failed to grasp? What Starmer can’t get his head round?

Well, that’s a very good question, obviously. I think one of the problems, and one that’s quite common across most countries, is the inability of the state, its public administration and its various agencies, to provide public services with the same speed, efficiency and inclusiveness as in the past. You hear this everywhere you go. I’ve lived in half a dozen European countries, most recently in Germany a few years ago, and what I saw there came as quite a shock, because I first lived in Germany for four years in the 1990s. So I saw up close how certain things no longer work as well as they used to. I’m thinking of things like the national railway service or the post office. All sorts of things. And once you get out of the big cities, it can get even worse.

France is another interesting example. There, you see small towns a long way from the big cities where the state is less present than it used to be. So, there’s no train station anymore. There’s no post office. There might not be a school any longer. And people feel that; they feel they’re being deserted and not looked after properly. And I think that’s something the political classes were very slow to grasp.

Of course, they were facing constraints, demands on the budget in all sorts of areas. But then public finances and the economy in general were subject to three major unexpected blows. First, the near total collapse of the financial system after 2008. Propping up the financial system cost an enormous amount of money, and the cost of the rescue was met by ordinary people. I think that woke up millions to the fact that their lives were being made harder to help the reckless people who had almost destroyed the financial system. That was blow number one. Then you had the pandemic, followed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which required a fiscal and military response from Europe. And all these things have had a major impact on the state of European public finances, meaning there is less money available for making sure that public services work well. And that annoys people.

And on top of that, you have the gradual increase in public awareness of issues relating to national identity and immigration. Which makes it very easy for people like Le Pen or politicians of that ilk in every country to connect the problem of less efficient and universal public services, low economic growth and the squeeze on living standards with national identity and immigration. They can make that connection.

Are you worried about the durability of democratic norms in Europe? Because we have fake news now, too. Our journalists have lost their credibility, as well. People go to social media for their news now. We see what’s happening in the United States with the Washington Post and all the media over there. But it’s happening in Europe, too.

Exactly. I think it would be a mistake for us to say that this is an imported American problem. Because it’s homegrown, however much it’s influenced by trends and events in the US. It’s been around for quite a while, too. As regards the health and survival of democracy, I’m not completely pessimistic. Partly because, if you look at countries in Europe where the hard right or right-wing populists have had a role in government, it’s obvious they haven’t done very well at all. In fact, they have really made a mess of things. A good example here is Austria, 10 years or so ago. Another more recent example is the Netherlands. Admittedly, the right-wingers were in coalitions in both cases, but they have shown that they find it very difficult to rise to the responsibilities that come with actually governing. There’s little more to then than slogans, or maybe campaigning. But while they run very clever campaigns, they lack a plan. Hence the mess.

Now, we might have to undergo the shock of seeing one of these parties in power in a larger European country. But my gut feeling is that they’ll make a mess of it. And then voters will have learned their lesson. Of course, I don’t want to be complacent about what that could mean. Still, if Trump has shown us one thing, its’ that democracy in America remains strong at the state and local levels.

Do you think Trump represents a lasting shift in American politics?

Unfortunately, I don’t think that either America or international relations will go back to what they were in 2016 or even 2020. So there are two questions here: The first is, would they simply carry on with a Trump-style agenda. And from what one can see, the answer to that is probably yes, though it would be less chaotic. I don’t think we would have that sense of “We just don’t know what’s going to happen next, day by day” that we have with Trump. I think it would be more orderly; still not comforting—my God no!—but there’d be more sort organization.

The second question is would the Republicans necessarily win? Not just the midterms in November, but the 2028 election. Because we just didn’t know! Much will depend on the integrity, fairness and freedom of those elections, of course. And there are grounds to worry that the electoral process will be threatened by Trump and the people around him. That’s a major worry. But if the elections are free—and people were worried that the 2024 election wasn’t going to be fully free, if you remember, when in fact it was. So I don’t think all is lost yet. And that’s huge, because, in Hungary for example, you can almost be certain in advance that the elections this coming April are not going to be fully free and fair.

Let’s get into Russia, Ukraine and the war. You have written about Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions reshaping Russia’s political culture while destroying freedom at home. Of course, this has affected the entire European security scene. The question is, how can this war be ended? Do you see the war coming to an end, and more specifically coming to an end in a way that leaves Europe secure?

Let’s divide that into two parts. First, in terms of Russia’s aims in the war, I think it is critical to understand that Russia’s fundamental goal is not territory; it is to completely discredit, or even obliterate, the idea of Ukrainian identity, nationhood and statehood.

That’s what he really wants to achieve. So that, even if a smaller entity called Ukraine survived, it would effectively not be a state. Of course, that is so completely unacceptable, not just to the Ukrainians but also to the vast majority of European states, that I cannot see how the war could end with a settlement that even approached Putin’s goal.

The answer to the second part of your question depends on how much pressure the Americans put on Ukraine to simply stop fighting. Because, if they wanted to pull the plug, they could. And it would be extremely difficult for Europe to make up the difference on its own. Because we’re not just talking about supplies of conventional weapons and fiscal financial support, which would be a heavy enough burden in itself for Europe to bear. No, there’s also all the high-tech military support, the satellites and intelligence—none of which the Europeans could currently provide. They just haven’t got the capacity.

So, in many ways, the answer to whether the war can end in the short term depends on whether America pulls the plug. And there is a real risk that Trump and one or two of the people around him lose patience and simply say “We’ve had enough of this”.

To conclude, then, we mustn’t think the two sides are arguing over an extra one or two or five percent of Ukraine’s territory. Because, fundamentally, this isn’t about the land at all; it’s about the survival of Ukraine as an independent state.

Let’s talk a little about the Epstein files. How much damage do you think they’ve done?  

I think it is serious. It feels more serious than the other scandals we’ve experienced over the last 20 years or so, and for the reasons you mention. First of all, the Epstein scandal has dragged on for longer than previous scandals. And, as you say, it seems to involve so many people.

In terms of damage, I think the closest comparison would probably be the loss of confidence that followed in the wake of the collapse of the financial system after 2008. In many ways, that was the beginning of our troubles. It was when people saw how recklessly the bankers, in fact everyone connected with finance in some way, had acted. And that the bill was picked up by ordinary people across the Western world. And like the Crash, the Epstein scandal is going to damage public trust in people in positions of power and authority, both elected and unelected. That doesn’t necessarily mean it will destroy people’s faith in democratic principles forever. But it does clearly increase the chance that, in some countries at the next election, people will vote for a party that seems to be less contaminated by such scandals—though, are they really?

I’m concerned, but when you look closely, you see that voters have fairly short memories. And, though it increases that risk, with the possible exception of somewhere like Hungary (though not even completely there), European countries still have very pluralistic cultures. And though there are some problems over freedom of speech, trust and so on, civic activism is still fairly strong there.

And let’s not forget that power is dispersed across the political and financial system. I’m thinking here of somewhere like Italy, where I also lived for a while. I’ve been hearing people saying “Oh, it’s all so fragile there, because the economy is stagnant and politicians aren’t trusted” for a long time now. But in actual fact, it’s quite a sophisticated system, so it’s very hard for one individual to amass power, or misuse power. The system was designed that way in the 1940s specifically to prevent that. And I think it works quite well.

So, everything’s not lost. There’s no need to pull a blanket over our heads and weep. No, not at all.

Thank you so very much for our discussion. I hope to see you in Delphi.

Yes. Absolutely. I’ll look forward to that. Thank you.

Barber will participate in the Delphi Economic Forum XI, taking place from 22–26 April 2026.