Athens is deeply concerned about the rapid developments in the negotiations aimed at establishing peace on the Russo-Ukrainian front. On the one hand, it appears that for the first time since 1945, broad territorial faits accomplis will be imposed through the use of force. On the other hand, the international order and diplomacy based on the principles of International Law are being pushed aside—loudly and conspicuously. At the same time, the Western security architecture is being redesigned amid a historic juncture and under the unprecedented conditions forming along the Russia–Ukraine border. Europe is assuming—willingly or not—a leading role in the post-war era, and the Greek government is confronted with critical strategic dilemmas.

The faits accomplis on the ground

From the first day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Athens—following what was termed a “principled foreign policy”—aligned itself with the then-U.S. administration, NATO, and the core of the EU. The violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity was explicitly condemned, and a decision was taken to provide assistance to the defending party. This stance—criticized mainly by the right-wing opposition—remains unchanged: a country threatened by a quintessentially revisionist neighbor cannot but oppose Russian expansionism in practice, especially when 36% of Cyprus has been occupied by Turkish troops for 52 years. “How else would we request allied support if Greece’s borders were attacked?” was the recurring question posed by government officials to those who expressed doubts.

Yet territory—a “red line” for Greece—is now being negotiated between Russians and Ukrainians, with the West appearing divided: Donald Trump considers border changes a given, while the Europeans still resist, though gradually edging toward reluctant compromise. After all, no definitive solution is possible without de facto Russian control over a large part of southeastern Ukraine. Experienced Greek diplomats tell To Vima that “the frightening thing is that there was discussion (in the initial U.S. 28-point proposal) even about de jure recognition of the territorial faits accomplis.” Although they note this will never happen, they stress that it reflects the rapid shift in the global geopolitical paradigm.

Naturally, this looming indirect “reward” of Russian revisionism worries Athens, as it opens a dangerous channel for legitimizing expansionism. “If Moscow occupies 20% of Ukraine by force, why wouldn’t Turkey attempt something similar?” our interlocutors ask—though the parallels, they admit, are not exact. Another concern is the near-total bypassing of traditional diplomatic methods, combined with Europe’s inability to determine the parameters of peace. The leaked Bloomberg transcript of the conversation between the U.S. envoy Steve Whitcomb and Putin aide Yuri Ushakov illustrates how the White House approaches international relations, sidestepping traditional tools such as International Law.

Regardless of what the agreement ultimately looks like, the government must already decode the shifting priorities of Europe’s security system, whose center of gravity is moving eastward to face a potential future Russian threat. Southern borders inevitably become secondary. This is why Prime Minister Mitsotakis, at the Copenhagen and Brussels summits, emphasized the need to protect the South—clearly pointing toward revisionist Turkey. Yet the EU’s 2022 “Strategic Compass” makes no such reference, leading critics to accuse the government of a one-sided reading of the landscape.

“It was a major opportunity for Greece to link its participation in the mechanism created to protect a country outside NATO and the EU with an explicit commitment from allies that they would assist Greece if attacked by Turkey,” a senior diplomat tells To Vima. They also note that Greece stands to lose from potential Ukrainian EU membership, as a significant share of EU funds will be directed to Kyiv’s long-term reconstruction needs.

Meanwhile, Greek-Russian relations appear fully ruptured, as Moscow believes Athens far exceeded acceptable limits in supporting Ukraine, disregarding long-standing ties. High-ranking Greek diplomatic sources insist to To Vima that “Greece’s stance was not wrong in any way—and today this is acknowledged by all. It’s not that we lacked alternatives; we simply did what was right, and that will benefit us far more.”

The cunning neutral and the predictable ally

Most analysts now view Turkey as an informal winner of the regional diplomatic game surrounding the Ukraine war. Maintaining relations with both sides—in a modern version of the long-known “cunning neutrality”—Ankara is co-shaping the new European security architecture while capitalizing on its position between East and West.

The Erdoğan government has repeatedly declared its readiness to participate in security-guarantee forces for Ukraine, even sending troops on the ground, while simultaneously playing a key role in the evolving collective defense industry—whether in the “Coalition of the Willing,” the EU’s autonomy project, or NATO. Additionally, in a reversal of history, Turkey is once again seen—as after World War II—as the last line of defense against Russian expansionism.

Athens will struggle to prevent Turkey’s growing influence in shaping post-war European affairs. Regarding developments on the ground—particularly the security-guarantee mechanism for Ukraine—it is clear that Greece will keep its distance despite possible pressure, effectively excluding itself from the front lines, through which it might have expanded its diplomatic capital. Still under discussion is the possibility of further military assistance to Kyiv, e.g., via intermediaries, as in the case of selling Mirage aircraft to France, which would then enter Ukrainian air defense. What is certain is that major Greek companies will participate in Ukraine’s reconstruction.

The government rejects the negative connotation of the term “predictable ally,” emphasizing instead Greece’s long-standing reliability and recalling that the country is now used by Washington as an energy hub. It also highlights the strategic character of Greek-American relations and the major opportunity of the moment: transforming Greece into a starting point for an alternative corridor transporting goods, military equipment, and personnel to Eastern Europe—bypassing the Straits and the Black Sea. But realizing this prospect requires rapid infrastructure upgrades at all levels, as well as overcoming obstacles such as the fact that Greece’s two largest ports are controlled by companies of Chinese and Russian interests.