It’s true that both Alexis Tsipras’s ELAS and the upcoming Antonis Samaras party represent (or are expected to represent) “products of a split,” from SYRIZA and New Democracy respectively.
This is, of course, not the first time new political formations have emerged this way. Political history in Greece and Europe is full of similar examples. The same has happened within all three parties that have held power since the restoration of democracy.
From the Political Right
Four parties originating from New Democracy have, at various points, made it into parliament: Stefanopoulos’s DIANA, Samaras’s Political Spring, Karatzaferis’s LAOS, and Kammenos’s Independent Greeks (ANEL) are foremost examples of this.
There were also others that either failed to enter parliament (such as Dora Bakoyannis’s Democratic Alliance and Stefanos Manos’s Drasi), suspended operations before national elections (such as Dimitris Avramopoulos’s KEP), or only ever won seats in the European Parliament (such as Voice of Reason).
From the Political Left
Within PASOK, splits have occurred since its earliest years (Socialist Course). Only Tsovolas’s DIKKI, however, became a significant force, entering parliament in 1996. Since the financial crisis, breakaway groups have grown more numerous but electorally weaker, examples include the Social Agreement of Katseli and Kastanidis, George Papandreou’s KIDISO, and Andreas Loverdos’s Democrats.
Within SYRIZA, focusing on the period after its electoral surge in 2012 and especially the 2015 bailout memorandum, numerous splits took place. In different elections, some offshoots cleared the 3 percent threshold (MeRA25, Freedom Sailing), while others failed to win seats, such as Lafazanis’s Popular Unity.
After Stefalos Kasselakis’s rise, New Left also emerged, and Kasselakis himself went on to found his own party (Movement for Democracy/Democrats, Progressive Center) after being expelled from SYRIZA.
Examining the Roots of Each Split
Whether these splits stem from expulsions and removals or from voluntary departures, the motives behind them vary widely.
Sometimes they are primarily ideological and concern the broader character of the party. For example, Simitis’s shift of PASOK toward the center and Kostas Karamanlis’s move of New Democracy toward more moderate ground helped pave the way for the founding of DIKKI and LAOS respectively. At other times, the split centers on a specific issue with ideological weight, such as the Macedonia naming dispute, which led to the creation of Political Spring.
On other occasions, a major crisis and how it was handled plays a role, as happened during the years of the bailout memorandums.
Quite often, though, the causes also involve personal rivalries over leadership or the distribution of influence within the party.
What all Party Formations Share in Common
Whatever their origins, parties born this way in post 1974 Greece have, so far, shared three common traits.
First, regardless of their electoral performance, they draw voters mainly away from their “parent” parties without actually replacing them electorally.
Second, they tend to be short lived politically, at best surviving for one or two parliamentary terms.
Third, they don’t always prevent the “parent” party from winning elections, as was the case with New Democracy in 1993. Simitis won in 1996 and 2000 despite DIKKI, Karamanlis was reelected in 2007 despite LAOS, Samaras came out on top in 2012 despite Independent Greeks, and Tsipras was reelected in September 2015 despite Popular Unity.
Given this track record, it seems unlikely that a new Samaras party could break the political pattern that historical experience has established.
The same, however, doesn’t appear to hold true for Tsipras. ELAS has, at least for now, effectively replaced SYRIZA in the polls, absorbing most of its 2023 voter base and possibly much of its cadre as well. One reason may be that this case differs from the previous examples of post 1974 splits. It’s the first time since 1974 that a politician with “founder” status in his own party has chosen to leave it in order to create another one. Technically, Tsipras didn’t found SYRIZA, but he led its sudden electoral rise and eventual path to power. He effectively defined the party in its modern form, and now he’s building a new one that aims to succeed it, all while taking advantage of SYRIZA’s prolonged decline.
He’s helped, to some extent, by the broader political environment: weakened ruling parties, the absence of a strict two party system, hollowed out party identities, electoral volatility, and low trust in political institutions. As a result, the role of individual figures has grown stronger, even for a former prime minister with a recent political past who helped shape that very environment. The argument that the opposition lacks a real “alternative” also seems to resonate with a meaningful part of the audience he’s targeting.
It remains to be seen, though, whether these conditions are enough to shift the balance of power, over time, both within and beyond the broader Greek left.
Panos Koliastasis holds a PhD in Political Science from Queen Mary University of London (QMUL) and teaches at the Department of Communication and Media Studies at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.
