What do young people in Southeast Europe really think about politics, democracy, and their future? And how have their views shifted after the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape?

A survey by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung offers some striking answers. Covering young people aged 14 to 29 in twelve countries—from Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina to Greece and Turkey—the survey data paints a complex picture of a generation shaped by uncertainty, inequality, and declining trust in democracy. Reflected in both a statistical report and a segmentation analysis, and supported by a dozen country studies, the survey data offers a set of revealing insights.

Compared to the FES’ previous youth survey in the region in 2018, the shift is clear. In just a few years, young people’s political realities have been reshaped by overlapping crises: a pandemic that disrupted education and employment, a major war on Europe’s doorstep, and a sense that global instability has become the norm rather than the exception. These experiences have left a clear imprint on how young people see their societies—and their place within them.

Across Southeast Europe, socio-economic concerns dominate youth anxieties and shape their attitudes toward politics, democracy, and social cohesion. Economic inequality is central to this story. Roughly one third of young people surveyed report limited or no access to education or vocational training due to financial barriers or inadequate infrastructure. Corruption and clientelism remain persistent features of everyday life, particularly in non-EU countries, where party affiliation is still widely perceived as a prerequisite for securing employment. For 62 percent of respondents, corruption is seen as the single biggest challenge their country will face in the next decade—followed by unemployment, brain drain, and the poor quality of public services. In Greece, concerns about a failing healthcare system top the list, with unemployment close behind.

These pressures are also reflected in young people’s attitudes toward migration. More than a quarter of young people across Southeast Europe express a strong desire to emigrate, driven primarily by economic motives: higher wages, better job prospects, improved living standards, and opportunities to start a business. Yet the picture is no longer one of permanent departure alone. Compared to 2018, there is a growing preference—particularly in non-EU countries—for circular migration. Increasingly, young people imagine leaving temporarily and returning home, suggesting that social and emotional ties remain intact even as frustration with domestic conditions persists. Greece fits this broader regional pattern. There, 30.4 percent of young people report a “strong” or “very strong” desire to emigrate, with economic concerns again topping the list of motivations—mirroring trends seen across the region.

Socio-economic insecurity also shapes how young people view democracy. While outright support for authoritarianism remains limited, the data points to a troubling ambivalence. Support for democracy has slightly declined, accompanied by growing doubts about whether democratic systems can deliver economic security. Nearly half of young people who strongly support democracy are also open to the idea of a “strong leader.” At the regional level, 34.7 percent would be willing to give up some civil liberties for a higher standard of living, while nearly 40 percent believe freedoms should sometimes be restricted in the name of security. This is not a rejection of democracy, but a warning: democratic legitimacy erodes when economic promises go unfulfilled.

The picture becomes even clearer through a segmentation analysis that identifies six distinct youth clusters. In Greece, the largest group—socially engaged progressives—holds strong commitments to gender equality, social justice, and European values. Yet no political party has successfully captured their loyalty. Despite their clarity on values, many remain undecided or split between parties. The result is a growing gap between what young people believe in and who represents them—arguably the most significant missed opportunity in Greek politics today.

On the conservative side, youth attitudes are equally fragmented. Traditional values coexist with economic anxiety and distrust toward mainstream parties. Some young conservatives are drifting toward nationalist or populist alternatives; others remain undecided altogether. What emerges is not polarization, but disillusionment.

Perhaps most importantly, the data challenges the assumption that young people are becoming more radical. In Greece, most young people place themselves near the political center, favoring gradual change over ideological confrontation. Their skepticism is directed less at democracy itself than at political elites they perceive as unresponsive or self-serving.

The message is clear. The future of politics in Southeast Europe will not be decided by louder slogans or sharper divisions. It will depend on whether political actors can rebuild trust, address material inequalities, and offer credible representation to a generation that knows what it stands for, but is still searching for someone who stands with it.

*Dr Elena Avramovska is Senior Researcher at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung’s office “Democracy of the Future” based in Vienna.