In the 1980s, a quiet tug-of-war unfolded high above the clouds. The European Space Agency’s (ESA) Ariane rocket program—designed to end Europe’s dependence on U.S. launchers—rapidly matured into a formidable commercial satellite option. The United States, long dominant in this arena, saw its interests threatened and employed diplomatic and economic pressure to discourage European governments from turning to Ariane. American intelligence services, including the National Security Agency (NSA), also allegedly surveilled European aerospace firms to glean proprietary technical data. Although no concrete evidence of sabotage ever emerged, rumours persist that external interference could have contributed to software and mechanical problems in early Ariane tests.

A similar yet more dangerous tension emerges today in nuclear research—a field that promises transformative scientific benefits but poses profound security risks. According to Forbes, while CERN, the world’s premier particle physics laboratory, ended its formal agreements with Russian researchers following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian scientists have reportedly maintained access to cutting-edge nuclear studies through the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR). This situation is a stark reminder that the openness fostering scientific breakthroughs can also open doors to scientific espionage and military exploitation. In November 2024, Moscow revised its nuclear doctrine—effectively lowering the threshold for nuclear weapon deployment—with consequences reaching far beyond the lab.

These developments reinforce a dilemma in big science partnerships. Post-war international labs like CERN have acted as institutional blueprints for navigating Cold War tensions without abandoning their mission of advancing “science for peace”,  pioneeting breakthroughs in high-energy physics while spurring milestone innovations in information technology and medicine. Such achievements depend on the free flow of ideas and data across borders. Yet, as the JINR story suggests, those with less benign intentions can sometimes exploit this same transparency.

The gravity of the allegations regarding JINR is hard to dismiss. Several sources claim that the institute maintains strong ties to Russian defence manufacturers and the Federal Security Service (FSB), possibly channelling advanced research into networks that jeopardise international security.

At the heart of the issue is the dual-use nature of modern scientific discoveries. Nuclear technology and advanced computing can yield innovations that benefit humanity—powering hospitals, communications, and clean energy—but they can also be co-opted for destructive ends. For instance, the same reactors that create life-saving radioisotopes can produce weapons-grade material with the proper modifications.

None of this is a call to end scientific progress or sever international partnerships. On the contrary, cross-border collaboration is critical to tackling urgent global challenges like climate change and pandemics. Instead, the challenge is building resilience into these collaborations as geopolitical rifts escalate.

Thus, there are calls for targeted sanctions against JINR and its principal partners that echo growing fears of espionage and potential militar misuse. Such measures would appear draconian in a world where scientific institutions were immune to geopolitical tensions. But a carefully calibrated response that safeguards specific sensitive research areas may be more constructive than blanket bans that could hamper legitimate inquiry. The overriding objective is to protect intellectual property and avert the militarization of scientific knowledge. Ultimately, the goal is to protect intellectual property and prevent the weaponisation of science.

Ensuring transparency without compromising security is a fine balancing act that hinges on science diplomacy’s capacity to quell tensions and foster cooperation. This requires the active involvement of organisations, especially the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The scientific community should also adopt a more rigorous approach to forging partnerships. Much like medical professionals abide by the “no harm” principle, international project researchers should uphold ethical standards that account for potential risks. Universities and research centres must also conduct thorough due diligence on prospective partners—especially when those partners are linked with defence agencies or intelligence organisations known for covert activities.

Preserving the integrity of global science demands renewed vigilance and accountability. Pursuing knowledge should never unwittingly support acts of aggression or expansionist policies. While CERN’s abrupt—and ultimately incomplete—severance from Russian institutions was an essential first move, the scientific community must reassess the structures that allowed continued collaboration despite official sanctions.

Ultimately, we face an uncomfortable truth: scientific innovation has always been entwined with power. It is precisely because science can transform our world that we must guard it carefully. The stakes have never been higher, and our choices today will echo for generations as a testament to responsible stewardship of such knowledge from exploitation.