Today, Kosovo holds its fifth parliamentary election since declaring independence in 2008. The previous election on February 14, 2021, delivered a historic victory for the Self-Determination Movement (LVV), which secured just over 50% of the vote. That outcome allowed incumbent PM Albin Kurti to form a government without a coalition—an unusual occurrence in Kosovo’s politics. However, it is widely expected that LVV and Kurti will struggle to replicate that result in this election.

Albin Kurti, Kosovo’s prime minister and leader of the Self-Determination party gestures during the closing electoral rally for the upcoming parliamentary elections, in Pristina, Kosovo February 7, 2025. REUTERS/Valdrin Xhemaj

The Electoral System in Kosovo and the Main Contenders

Kosovo uses a single, multi-member electoral district with an open-list proportional system, with a 5% threshold. Voters select a party and may choose up to ten candidates from that party’s list for the 120-seat Assembly. Of these 120 seats, 20 are reserved for non-majority communities: 10 for Kosovo Serbs and 10 for other minority groups such as Bosniaks, Turks, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians. Among Kosovo Serbs, the Belgrade-backed Serbian List (Srpska Lista) is expected to win all 10 reserved Serb seats.

A woman votes during the parliamentary elections in Pristina, Kosovo, February 9, 2025. REUTERS/Florion Goga

Four major Albanian-led parties are contesting the remaining 100 open seats: the Self-Determination Movement (LVV), led by Prime Minister Albin Kurti; the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), founded by former President Hashim Thaçi, which is fielding Bedri Hamza—former Governor of the Central Bank of Kosovo and current Mayor of Mitrovica—as its prime ministerial candidate; the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), established by the late President Ibrahim Rugova and now led by Lumir Abdixhiku, who serves as its prime ministerial candidate; and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), led by Ramush Haradinaj, a former Kosovo Liberation Army general and former Prime Minister. Meanwhile, a newcomer calling itself the “Family List” has entered the race after several LVV Assembly members broke away, citing disagreements over policies such as the legalization of civil unions for same-sex couples.

Lumir Abdixhiku, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, votes during the parliamentary elections in Pristina, Kosovo, February 9, 2025. REUTERS/Florion Goga

Lumir Abdixhiku, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, speaks during the closing electoral rally for the upcoming parliamentary elections, in Pristina, Kosovo, February 8, 2025. REUTERS/Valdrin Xhemaj

Shift in Voter Sentiment

Kurti’s 2021 landslide was seen as ushering in a new political elite. However, many voters now argue that a course correction for the country is necessary, particularly in Kosovo’s relations with the European Union and the United States, which have cooled in recent years.

Two major themes have defined the campaign. On security and relations with Serbia, Kurti highlights his efforts to assert Kosovo’s authority in the Serb-majority north, emphasizing his handling of tensions with Serbia and the EU-led normalization dialogue as key achievements. Conversely, the opposition has focused on domestic challenges—criticizing shortcomings in the economy, education, and healthcare, citing corruption scandals and deteriorating foreign policy. They also point to the EU’s suspension of some financial disbursements and of formal dialogue under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement structures.

Kurti’s supporters, including the diaspora, acknowledge governance gaps but commend his stance in the north as a necessary pushback against Serbian interference. Even some opposition voters concede that his approach there has been effective. Yet public frustration with stalled economic development and strained diplomacy could erode his support base.

Since taking office nearly four years ago, Kurti’s administration has faced criticism for unfulfilled promises and a confrontational foreign policy. Unlike in 2021, LVV has not released a formal election program this year—perhaps to avoid renewed scrutiny of its previous unmet goals. Recent polls still show LVV leading, but much will depend on voter turnout, as lower turnout is likely to undermine the party’s chances for a strong result.

Possible Post-Election Scenarios

With LVV unlikely to achieve an outright majority, a coalition or prolonged caretaker government seems probable. Both LVV and opposition parties have shown reluctance to govern together, though international pressure may compel cooperation to avoid a political deadlock.

A man votes during the parliamentary elections in Pristina, Kosovo, February 9, 2025. REUTERS/Florion Goga

Complicating matters further is the looming election of the new president of Kosovo, which must take place by early March 2026 as the mandate of the current President Osmani-Sadriu concludes. Kosovo’s constitutional standards require two-thirds of Assembly members to be physically present for the vote, even if a simple majority ultimately decides the outcome in the third round. Failure to elect a president triggers new parliamentary elections. Any government formed after today’s vote will try to secure at least 81 seats to ensure a successful presidential election and avoid a short-lived administration and new elections early next year.

If Kurti’s Self-Determination Movement (LVV) wins fewer than 40 seats, it is likely that the opposition will form the next government—though it may be unstable. Much will depend on whether the opposition remains cohesive or opts to join forces with LVV. The international community may favor a coalition government between LVV and an opposition party as a path toward greater stability and progress on key issues, such as establishment of the ASM.
Looking ahead, 2025 is expected to bring significant pressure—from both the EU and the United States—to advance talks on normalizing relations with Serbia. During President Trump’s first term, Kurti had a particularly contentious relationship with his administration, especially with Richard Grenell (the former acting director of National Intelligence). Kurti publicly endorsed President Biden in the 2020 election, urging Albanian Americans to support him.

A central issue in the normalization process is the establishment of the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM), which is also critical for ensuring the participation of Kosovo Serbs in the municipal elections slated for October 2025. If no agreement is reached on the ASM, Kosovo Serbs could boycott those local elections, further heightening tensions.

Kurti could gamble on forming a short-lived coalition or even ceding power to the opposition—anticipating that any new government will face intense international demands on the ASM. By positioning himself as the principled holdout against external pressure, he might hope to return to power with a stronger mandate if fresh elections occur within a year. It remains unclear whether the opposition would risk playing into such a scenario.

Today’s parliamentary elections seem poised to yield an uncertain outcome, potentially resulting in either a coalition government or a political crisis. While the Self-Determination Movement still leads in most polls, it is unlikely to replicate its dominant 2021 victory. The fractured opposition, ongoing diplomatic strains, and the upcoming municipal and election of the new President at the start of 2026, have significantly raised the stakes. Whatever the result, the post-election negotiations and the fate of the ASM will profoundly influence Kosovo’s immediate and longer-term future.

Ramadan Ilazi is Head of Research at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS) and a Research Fellow with the South-East Europe Programme of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)