On April 23, 2010, then-Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou announced from the remote island of Kastellorizo that Greece would seek support from the international bailout mechanism, ushering in the era of memoranda. Fifteen years later, he reflects on the decisions, misinterpretations, and assesses the political system of the time.
Mr. President, thank you for this interview. Let’s begin with some fragments of memory. How, where, and by whom was the Kastellorizo announcement decided?
“Thank you, Mr. Dimitrolopoulos, for giving me the opportunity, fifteen years after Greece’s appeal to the support mechanism, to speak about that critical period of difficult decisions. What continues to be absent from public life is precisely that: bold, historic decisions. These are what break the vicious cycles of chronic pathologies that have haunted us since the formation of the Greek state.The tragic irony? While Hellenism thrives abroad, at home it sabotages itself. This isn’t in our DNA. It’s the product of a corrupt system, still present today, echoing the chaos of that crisis period: a government treating public funds as personal wealth, with no strategic vision for rebuilding production, a huge trade deficit worse than 2009’s, and a country’s credibility being tested again by arrogance and disrespect for institutions.As for the 2010 decisions, they followed thorough discussion with my finance ministers, Giorgos Papakonstantinou and Filippos Sachinidis, and my economic advisor, Heraklis Polemarchakis. Before the address, the informal Cabinet met with all ministers and close aides. We assessed the situation in depth and agreed on the likelihood of turning to the mechanism.”
So you decided, with consensus, to go to Kastellorizo – a remote island. And were criticized for this choice.
“The decision was mine. It had both practical and symbolic weight. Practically, it signaled ‘our work continues,’ including the scheduled development meeting with stakeholders in the Dodecanese. But more importantly, Kastellorizo, for me, has always symbolized creative Hellenism—resilient, turning crisis into opportunity.And it’s a crucial point for the conversation on the continental shelf and our EEZ. The world saw the address—not just us. International media. What better projection and affirmation for this special island? If for some it became a symbol of crisis, I invite them to visit. Because Kastellorizo, with its warm, resilient people, isn’t just a reminder of a tough moment—it’s a call to stop the self-sabotage and invest again in our real strengths: our geopolitical position, our values, our culture, with vision and responsibility.”
And on April 23, you delivered the address. Had you spoken with other political leaders beforehand?
“Yes, I informed them all, including Ms. Bakoyannis, who supported the national effort—unlike her brother, who sided with Mr. Samaras, banking on populism.There was concern among party leaders but no serious objection or alternative. Why? Because there was no alternative. Markets were ruthless. Greece was in total uncertainty—reminding me of today’s climate with Trump’s tariffs. The choice was clear: adjustment program or default and chaos.Remember, we had just established the European support mechanism, to show the markets Greece had a strong backstop—enough to calm the storm. That achievement was undermined by Merkel’s hesitation and Schäuble’s public talk of Grexit.”
The day before, the real deficit numbers were released. Could it be seen as an “admission” to creditors that we’d been hiding the truth? Should you have handled it differently?
“There was no ‘admission.’ The international community already knew. What we didn’t know was the scale of the cover-up by the previous government—we only learned the true deficit in late 2010.As head of government, I had to speak the truth—not just morally, but to address the core problem: not the deficit itself, but the deficit of trust. Truth was the only currency that could begin to restore it.There was also a second message: that it was time for major change. Greece had gone from the Olympics and the euro to economic pariah in five years, due to borrowed prosperity and patronage politics. Decades of progress were wiped out.”
What was the mood at home and abroad?
“Let me say this: it is deeply troubling that Greek justice pursued a patriot like Andreas Georgiou, who simply did his job revealing the real fiscal picture. Meanwhile, the European Parliament later called those past practices ‘accounting fraud.’ But that came too late.The U.S.-originated crisis became a fiscal one in Europe, and Greece—its weakest link—was hit first.”
Do your counterparts abroad accept this view?
“Merkel initially believed the problem was purely Greek. I warned her Germany would pay the price too, as it did.In February 2010, in Brussels—Merkel, Sarkozy, Barroso, Juncker, Trichet, Papakonstantinou—we started tough talks on creating a support mechanism. I told Barroso, who had long denied problems as Commission President, that the Commission knew, tolerated, and concealed the truth.Merkel didn’t trust the Barroso Commission and insisted on IMF involvement. In 2016, even the late George Provopoulos admitted that from 2008, there was an orchestrated effort to hide the debt. The IMF’s Bob Traa had been asked not to publish a report warning of €800 billion in debt, fearing public outrage.”
One counterargument is that the Papandreou government was too slow to act.
“That’s false. We took immediate measures in 2009 once we confirmed the previous data was fictitious—€15.9 billion in cuts by April 2010, the largest adjustment ever by an OECD country. We cut the deficit by about 5% by year-end.”
Some say elections could have been an escape route.
“Holding elections in the middle of a looming bankruptcy would’ve been a national disaster. That would have put party interests above the country’s. I wasn’t elected to avoid responsibility—I carried it, unlike others.”
Why didn’t you seek a supermajority to pass the memorandum?
“I had already spoken to Mr. Samaras, who said he would vote against it. I couldn’t gamble with the country’s future. My priority was restoring credibility. Today, we see how uncertainty freezes markets. That was the chaos we were living in.”
The day after the address, the word “troika” appears in headlines. What were your ministers saying?
“The government rose to the occasion. My ministers and party stood firm until spring 2011. What changed afterward is a discussion for another time. But let’s not forget: ours was the only post-dictatorship government without a scandal—no institutional or ethical lapse. We governed transparently in a national emergency.”
Two phrases ignited backlash: “There is money” and “We spent it together.” How do you reflect on them now?
“Let me be clear. Yes, money existed—but not for waste or cronyism. It existed if we went after those who hoard it, misuse it, or exploit the system.My phrase meant: funds exist if we attract investment, clean up the state, use our productive strengths, and create sustainable wealth. But that requires planning—public-interest planning, not party-favored deals.The phrase wasn’t a slogan—it was a denunciation of a state bleeding from corruption and mismanagement.”
Would you still say that today?
“I’m criticized for still saying it—and I do say it. Just look at Tempi: the government failed to install modern rail signaling despite having the funds, but it quickly built a cover-up and ran a smear campaign online. ‘There is money’ was not naive optimism—it was a call to rebuild the country with values and justice.”
Would you call that your legacy?
“Let me give you concrete examples. We created ‘Diavgeia’ (Transparency), taxing large wealth and offshore assets, cutting waste, opening closed professions, launching e-prescriptions and digital governance.These challenged the entrenched post-dictatorship system. When I proposed public control over recapitalized banks, they revolted. What hurt Greece wasn’t ‘there is money’—it was those who ensured the rest of the phrase was forgotten.”
Is that how you view today’s Greece—a system that creates crises?
“Yes. Greece is being sold off. Recovery funds go to the few. Renewable energy is monopolized. Citizens are sidelined.Beneath the ‘executive state’ lies the same corrupt network that bankrupted the country. There’s no transparency, no rules, no oversight—just like under Karamanlis.Unless we end clientelism and build transparent, accountable democratic institutions, Greece will remain stuck. Crises aren’t random—they are products of opacity and cowardice. And the people always pay the price. We confronted the root of the problem. That’s why we’re feared.”
Let’s go back. Portugal agreed on a bailout together. Why didn’t Greece?
“When we took responsibility, we asked for unity—not for ourselves, but to save the country. Instead, we got populism and self-interest.Unlike others, we didn’t profit from people’s pain. And the cost of their refusal was heavy. The crisis deepened. Recovery was tragically delayed.New Democracy and SYRIZA offered false hope and then governed differently. That betrayal created today’s distrust and apathy.We dared. We reformed. In 2011, we didn’t abandon duty. We forced consensus under sabotage. Slowly, history is restoring the truth.”
Did that period cost you personally? The foreign press published nearly 15,000 articles, some calling Greeks lazy.
“It cost me, and our nation deeply. The economic pain was less than the injustice and insult. But the people were ready. They supported reform.Many in Europe preferred scapegoating to solidarity. But trust is rebuilt not with numbers, but with truth, clarity, and consistency.I was known abroad, committed to reform. That helped break stereotypes. Step by step, respect returned. It kept Greece at the heart of Europe.”
Would you change any key decision—Kastellorizo, the memorandum, the referendum, your resignation?
“Not the strategic ones. But I would change two things: communication and political groundwork.We should’ve explained more to the people, and from 2009’s campaign made it clear that deep change was needed. The crisis wasn’t caused by the memorandum—it was the product of a clientelist Greece.If there had been oversight from 2004–2009, when debt rose from €180 to €300 billion, we wouldn’t have reached the brink. The crisis wasn’t inevitable—irresponsible governance made it explode.”
One last question: Imagine you’re at a table with Merkel and Sarkozy. What would you say to each?
“The question takes me back—but also forward. Their silence in their memoirs speaks volumes.I’d call for a rethink of Europe. Not just rehashing the past, but envisioning a fairer, more humane, more participatory future. One that doesn’t pass the crisis burden to the weak, but embeds solidarity in governance.I’d remind them of my proposals: Eurobonds, investment in renewables, energy autonomy, and a shared defense policy rooted in values.These are the pillars of dignity—for every European citizen.”
