Relations between Germany and Greece have fallen into a period of quiet. Bilateral diplomacy at the highest levels came to a halt for several months due to Germany’s elections and the protracted process of forming a new government. Still, the few official statements issued during this time have conveyed optimism. “We have every reason to be optimistic after Friedrich Merz’s victory,” said Greek government spokesman Pavlos Marinakis at the end of February. Andreas Kindl, Germany’s ambassador to Athens, struck a similarly upbeat tone, noting that Friedrich Merz and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis enjoy a friendly relationship. “I expect our relations to become even closer – and very soon,” the ambassador said.
Viewed from a historical perspective, German-Greek relations have experienced both highs and lows. Following the turbulence of the financial crisis, the relationship today is widely regarded as good—some even say very good. The vicious cycle of austerity memoranda, economic collapse, and negative rhetoric from both sides has been broken. This improvement is primarily due to Greece’s economic recovery. In Berlin and other European capitals, Greek representatives no longer appear as supplicants but now engage in consultations with heads held high and as equals.
The economic recovery has greatly benefited Greece’s tarnished image abroad, particularly in Germany. For many years, Greece was seen in broad segments of German society as a haven of corruption, waste, and decline. Today, it is not unusual to hear that Germany—now grappling with its own economic troubles—could learn from Greece’s path to recovery.
Beyond the ups and downs of politics, economic relations have remained a stable foundation of the partnership. In tourism, bilateral trade, and German investment, the two countries share a consistent success story. The vibrancy of these ties was on full display last autumn at the Thessaloniki International Fair, where Germany was honored as the official guest country.
Yet where there is light, there is also shadow, as a German proverb goes. The long shadow of history—specifically Germany’s occupation of Greece during World War II and its enduring legacy—continues to disrupt the harmony between Athens and Berlin. This tension surfaced most recently last October during what was intended to be the high point of political relations: a visit by German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Planned as a celebratory moment, the visit ended in disappointment. After a three-day program, the president and his delegation left feeling disillusioned. According to diplomatic circles, some even described the outcome as a “catastrophe.” The misstep largely stemmed from the German side: their decision to place remembrance of the occupation and associated atrocities at the center of the visit led to predictable—and public—Greek demands for reparations during live televised events.
The episode served as a reminder that, despite all the friendly rhetoric, the unresolved issue of reparations still hangs over German-Greek relations like a sword of Damocles.
It is unlikely that Germany’s new chancellor will deviate from the country’s long-held position that the issue of reparations is “settled.” Nevertheless, history remains a subject that binds the two nations. In the 144-page coalition agreement signed by the new governing Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, “Greece” is mentioned only once—where the government pledges to continue supporting projects aimed at grappling with and commemorating this darkest chapter of German-Greek history. In this regard, nothing will change.
Another issue, however, is poised to move to the forefront of the bilateral agenda. During his campaign, Friedrich Merz promised a hardline shift in German migration policy. Echoing the rhetoric of Donald Trump, Merz pledged to take immediate steps to curb illegal immigration from his first day in office. Among other measures, Germany plans to continue strengthened border controls and ramp up deportations of refugees and asylum seekers—policies that remain controversial even within Germany.
Merz faces mounting pressure from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which has, for the first time in a poll, surpassed his Christian Democratic Union (CDU).
To deliver on his campaign promises to reduce refugee numbers, Merz will need Greece’s cooperation. German authorities have long been vexed by so-called secondary migration—refugees moving from one EU country to another. New momentum for Berlin’s agenda now comes from a Federal Administrative Court ruling allowing the deportation of “single, healthy, and employable” migrants who had previously been granted asylum in Greece. According to media reports, between 40,000 and 45,000 individuals could be affected. Last year alone, over 25,000 people applied for asylum in Germany despite already holding protected status in Greece.
However, Greek Migration Minister Makis Voridis has made clear that Athens is unwilling to take these migrants back. This does not bode well for cooperation. German diplomatic sources in Athens warn that the issue of migration—which has repeatedly caused friction between the two governments over the years—could very soon pose the first major strain on bilateral relations.
In previous years, Berlin’s stance toward Turkey has also caused periodic tensions with Athens. One need only recall Germany’s controversial sale of submarines to Turkey’s navy—a transaction Athens unsuccessfully tried to block. Today, the flashpoint has shifted from submarines to Eurofighter jets. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan urgently needs new aircraft to modernize his aging air force. In recent weeks, observers have witnessed a confusing political spectacle: initially, reports suggested that Olaf Scholz’s outgoing government was blocking the sale of Eurofighters in protest over the imprisonment of Istanbul’s mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu. Shortly thereafter, a spokesperson for Germany’s Ministry of Economic Affairs denied these reports, stating that the caretaker government was doing nothing that would restrict the next administration’s freedom to act.
The new coalition agreement, outlining Berlin’s policy direction for the next four years, offers no specifics on arms deals with Turkey. It does, however, note that arms exports must be more closely aligned with Germany’s foreign, economic, and security interests. Elsewhere, the document describes Turkey as “an important strategic partner within NATO, a neighbor of the EU, and a key actor in the Middle East, with whom we aim to address geopolitical challenges ranging from security policy to migration.” While the language contains no real surprises, it reaffirms the consistency of Germany’s approach to Turkey.
The coming weeks and months will reveal whether—and to what extent—Friedrich Merz will consider Greek concerns in his Turkey policy. Ultimately, his choices in this matter will influence the future quality of German-Greek also.
Dr. Ronald Meinardus is a Senior Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).
