While there is a point to Turkey’s participation in SAFE, the new financial instrument for supporting the European defence industry, it does not necessarily make sense.
There is a point for those who want to see a larger European system in place. Because it will be made stronger by the participation of countries that aren’t EU member-states.
But it doesn’t make sense when these countries clearly do not share the need for European defence, or show any inclination to support it. When they simply want to get their hands on some cash to pump into their own defence industries.
The agreement reached in Brussels supposedly secures European defence while limiting the risk of EU cash bolstering ‘random’ defence industries on the take.
In reality, it guarantees nothing. Because nothing is clear or given, since a majority of states have decided to treat Turkey like an important partner, albeit for reasons of expediency.
Of course, the government can claim to have ensured that “safeguards” are in place. Meaning that specific agreements can only be reached with third countries like Turkey when there is no imminent threat of war, and that such decisions need to be unanimous.
I’m not even sure Turkey noticed.
Ankara has never spared a thought for “safeguards”, or fretted over objections made against it.
As a country, it simply does what it considers to be to its advantage, which is also why its silly idea of rebranding itself as “European” has run aground. Because Turkey isn’t European.
Needless to say, this does not free the government—and Greek policy in general—of the need to take the new developments into account in their approach to Turkey. Including those developments that arise from a turn of events that is in Greece’s favour.
Because, truth be told, we are discussing European defence at a time when Turkey is firmly on the ‘wrong’ side in both of the major issues of the day (Ukraine and the Middle East), which are also regional issues.
So what sort of defence can we look forward to?
On the other hand, of course, objections are not policy.
It makes no sense for the country to exclude itself from the EU’s inner workings in the name of an opposition that many in Europe consider both harmful and secondary.
We mustn’t sulk.
What we should do is aim to limit Turkey’s involvement in European affairs as far as we can, unless it comes accompanied by powerful guarantees that our neighbour will behave like a modern European democracy.
And since Turkey does not behave, or think, along such lines—meaning that no such guarantees can be given—European defence can actually be built on foundations that both have a point and make sense.
