“We went through something truly harrowing. Enormous stress. To have 20 to 25 aircraft in your sector but not have them on your frequency. Or to watch each of the four sectors operating at the time desperately try, using an exhausted emergency frequency from the Northern Sector, to locate its own aircraft…”

The anxiety is unmistakable in the eyes of the air traffic controller who, on the morning of the first Sunday of the year, was called in to manage—alongside her colleagues—what would prove to be an unprecedented and deeply damaging blackout in the Athens FIR (Flight Information Region). The same words—dangerous and unprecedented—were later used by Greece’s Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA, formerly YPA) in its official statement issued that afternoon.

The scale of the incident was such that it immediately triggered a judicial investigation ordered by the head of the Athens Prosecutor’s Office, Aristidis Koreas, as well as a sworn administrative inquiry launched by the Civil Aviation Authority following instructions from Infrastructure and Transport Minister Christos Dimas. At the same time, a Special Investigative Committee was established to examine the causes of the blackout, coordinated by Christos Tsitouras, head of the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority.

The Committee met on Epiphany Day and issued a statement noting that “the investigation so far appears to locate the problem in telecommunications infrastructure and has not identified evidence of a cyberattack on the Civil Aviation Authority’s systems.”

According to information available, since January 6 members of the Committee have been holding daily meetings “at a technical level” with Civil Aviation Authority officials. Yet as of late Friday night, the precise causes of the air traffic disruption had still not been fully clarified. Opinions among aviation professionals diverge: some point to obsolete air navigation systems, others to the possibility of a cyber incident. On one point, however, there is unanimous agreement—the system currently operating in Greece is vulnerable due to its age.

Minister Dimas has announced that modernization of systems at Athens International Airport is planned to be completed by 2028.

Problems, Every Single Day

“Frequency problems are a daily occurrence, because the systems are old. The transmitters and receivers on the mountains are decades old. They’ve been exposed to snow, cold, hail, rain, sun… And our own circuits are old as well. It’s a 30-year-old system—an unbelievable length of time for aviation. They constantly break down, constantly malfunction, frequencies keep dropping,” Olga Toki tells To Vima.

Toki works as an air traffic controller in the airport approach sector and is also vice president of the controllers’ union.

“During every shift, there are bulletins for radio navigation aids and incidents. The first thing we do at work is check the radio aids bulletin to see what is operational and which tools we won’t be able to use. If something fails during the shift, we log it in the incident report. There are times when the radio aids bulletin is an entire page filled with frequencies and radar systems that are not working. That is our daily reality,” she explains.

She recalls working a shift about a year ago during severe weather in Athens. “I was on duty during a thunderstorm. Aircraft couldn’t approach Eleftherios Venizelos Airport. They were holding over different parts of Attica, flying in circles, and at some point the frequencies dropped. Can you imagine how difficult and stressful it is to be in a storm, the aircraft not knowing how long it will have to wait, and you having lost the frequency and being unable to communicate?”

Interference on the Frequencies

Because of the age of the systems, frequency interference is common. “What do pilots hear? Everything—from ‘snow’ (static) to radio stations. This has happened many times on the frequency. So frequency issues don’t surprise us. But what happened on Sunday, January 4, was massive. Many frequencies—most of them—went down simultaneously.”

According to Toki, Greece’s air navigation systems should have been replaced at least a decade ago. “We are at least 10 years behind. A radar system has an average lifespan of 10 years. Ours is 26 years old and heading toward 27.”

The radar is just as outdated as the frequencies. “Losing radar is extremely dangerous. It doesn’t happen often, but we do experience periods of malfunction. Losing radar means you don’t see aircraft on your screen. A few years ago we had a blackout and for an hour we were staring at a black screen.”

But what she describes as even more insidious is something she has personally experienced: partial radar failures. “You might see 10 aircraft on your radar screen—and not see one. You see 10 planes, but one is missing. That is incredibly dangerous, because you believe the airspace is clear when in reality there is a potential conflict. When you see a black screen, you know you see nothing. But when you see 10 aircraft and one is missing, you have the illusion that everything is fine. And it isn’t. This has been happening frequently over the past year.”

Toki is quick to clarify that there is no immediate risk of mid-air collision, as aircraft are equipped with collision avoidance systems that activate when planes come too close—something pilots themselves confirm.

“Those who were in the air at the time of the blackout felt unsafe,” says a pilot with a major airline. “Not so much because of the risk of collision—there is a pre-planned route, and aircraft have onboard collision-avoidance systems. The real anxiety is about fuel. Whether there will be enough fuel to land the aircraft safely.”

“Not Even in Third-World Countries”

“The scale and extent of this incident are globally unprecedented. An entire FIR going down—across all frequencies above 10,000 feet—for nine hours is something you don’t encounter even in third-world countries,” says Grigoris Konstantellos, mayor of Vari–Voula–Vouliagmeni and a pilot and co-pilot since 1988 with Olympic Airways.

According to Konstantellos, the radio frequency system is severely outdated, with the last substantial investment and upgrade dating back to 1999. “The system upgrade,” he notes, “is scheduled to be implemented over the next two to three years. In other words, there is now an attempt to do in three years what was not done in Greece’s air navigation infrastructure over the past 25 to 30 years.”

The Athens FIR incident has laid bare what aviation professionals have been warning about for years: a critical system weathered by snow, time, and neglect, operating far beyond its intended lifespan. While investigations continue and modernization plans are announced, those who work daily behind the radar screens insist that the real issue is not what failed—but how long it has been allowed to.