In a region defined by complex geopolitics, shifting alliances, and historic tensions, the Middle East remains one of the most volatile and consequential corners of the globe. As President Donald Trump embarks on his latest visit to the region, questions loom over his approach to the Gaza conflict, U.S.-Israel relations, and broader strategic priorities.
To unpack these developments, we sat down with Sean Mathews, a seasoned Greek-American journalist with extensive reporting experience across the Middle East. A correspondent with Middle East Eye and a frequent contributor to The Economist, Al Jazeera, and Al-Monitor, Mathews offers a unique perspective on U.S. foreign policy, the evolving dynamics of the region, and Greece’s emerging role as a key player in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this candid interview, Mathews discusses Trump’s Middle East tour, the potential for a nuclear deal with Iran, and the implications for Turkey-U.S. relations and Greece’s geopolitical future.
Sean Mathews, Correspondent with Middle East Eye
President Trump is visiting the Middle East. Do you foresee any significant shift in the U.S. position on the Gaza conflict, or will Washington continue to back Prime Minister Netanyahu’s military strategy in the region and war in Gaza?
What we have seen up until now is Donald Trump compartmentalizing, either knowingly or unknowing, the Gaza file and others like Syria, Iran and Yemen. Trump was largely responsible for forcing Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire in January with Hamas. Israel unilaterally broke that ceasefire in March and resumed attacking Gaza. Trump gave Israel a freehand to pursue its war there and lay total siege to the enclave. At the same time, Trump burned Netanyahu on files like Yemen, Iran and Syria. I think that compartmentalization is weakening. Trump may be starting to realize that Gaza is a festering open wound that he can not ignore because it will continue to destabilize the region. In sum, Trump may not care what happens in Gaza for Gaza’s sake, but he has to care on a geopolitical level and increasingly for a domestic audience of ‘America First’ supporters who are becoming more vocal against Israel’s war on Gaza and occupation of parts of Syria and Lebanon.
Trump is under pressure from Arab leaders. Israel’s ongoing, and very public effort, to conduct a forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza would destabilize Egypt and potentially Jordan—these are regime collapse level concerns. While the UAE has been more open to a forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, Saudi Arabia has resisted that. Trump has also been lobbied personally by Jordan’s King to back off his plan for a Gaza riviera, I am told.
This week, we have seen Trump frustrated that Netanyahu has resisted his most basic effort to allow aid into the Gaza Strip in advance of his visit to the Middle East. The direct negotiations between Hamas and the US that we saw this week which freed dual US-Israeli citizen Edan Alexander are the most concerning for Israel and I believe signal a shift in how the US approaches Gaza. For Hamas and the US to cut a bilateral deal is unprecedented. Hamas’s decision to release Alexander was an effort to show the Trump administration that it is not the party standing in the way of a ceasefire. This will exacerbate the domestic divide over the war inside Israel and put more pressure on Netanyahu. We can’t underestimate how bad the release of Alexander looks for Netanyahu.
Notably, the President’s itinerary does not include a stop in Israel. What message is the administration sending with this decision?
Let’s start with the message to Israel. In the days ahead of Trump’s visit we have seen a crescendo of Israeli media reports that reaffirm what I am hearing in private from US and Arab officials, and which we are all seeing in public: a real rift between Trump and the Israelis. I think it has taken many in the Washington establishment and certainly in Israel for surprise, but for those of us tracking Trump’s America First approach to foreign policy its a natural extension of this White House’s priorities. Trump moved to strike a ceasefire with the Houthis in Yemen after US strikes failed to meaningfully degrade the group. I think the failure of the Houthi campaign will reaffirm Trump’s distrust of military adventurism in the Middle East, if this truce holds. Remember, Trump was also under serious pressure from Saudi Arabia to stop the US bombing before he arrived in the Kingdom, US officials told me. Trump left Israel out to dry, even saying the Houthis were “very brave” under American fire—a line, a may add, which many in the Arab and Muslim world believe—including the Houthis bitter enemies. One US defence official described the ceasefire to me as Israel’s ‘Aramco moment’ that is a reference to Trump’s decision in 2019 not to respond to an attack emanating from Iran on Saudi Arabia’s oil installations. That crystalized for the Saudis the sense that the US’s security umbrella was no longer a blank check. What it prompted from Riyadh was the start of an effort to begin a delicate detente with Iran.
What are its core priorities during this Middle East tour? A nuclear deal with Iran?
This visit has been framed by some as one lacking strategic vision and purely focused on economic ties. I think that underestimates its significance. The biggest cloud hanging over Trump is a nuclear deal with Iran for sure. Trump had two major files to address when he became president. He promised to end the Russian-Ukraine war and handle the Iranian nuclear file. The irony for Trump is that the Iranians may deliver him the deal he craves so much instead of Putin. Trump unilaterally withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal. The only deal he can really strike with Iran is a reincarnation of that, but of course on much weaker terms for the US because Iran has advanced so far in its nuclear programme. Trump is going to be lobbied very hard by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE to strike a nuclear deal with Iran. None of these countries want a war with Iran and all of them are pursuing detente with the Iranians, even if it is a wary and fragile one.
Trump is hyping up the economic side of this visit and today the White House announced deals worth $600bn with the Saudis. These are mainly MOU’s and many are unlikely to materialize. The reality is that Saudi official are going to be lobbying US companies to invest in the Kingdom just as hard as US officials will be lobbying the Saudi Public Investment fund to invest in the US. Saudi Arabia’s main challenge is that it has failed to attract foreign direct investment into its Vision 2030 programme, with FDI dropping to 2020 Covid era levels last year.
But there is a bigger truth to Trump’s focus on economic deals. Trump is bringing his version of the Middle East Bazaar to the oil-rich Gulf. It’s more than merely transactional; it reveals a desperate, poorer, multipolar order. In a shaky global economy, with huge debt levels and stretched government budgets, countries are scrambling for investments.
The Europeans, the Japanese and the South Koreans can not give Trump the kinds of top down immediate investments he wants in the US economy. That is something that only the oil-rich Monarchs with sovereign wealth funds can. We are also seeing a big shift with this administration to loosen export restriction rules, not just on arms sales but AI chips and other technology. Again, this represents the fierce competition in the world for Gulf money at a time when budgets are stretched. China is catching up to the US on weapons systems and AI, across critical technologies. The view of the Trump administration people I speak with is that the US doesn’t have the luxury of severely restricting chips and weapons exports anymore in the name of protecting its technology.
President Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have demonstrated a strong personal rapport. Could this lead to a renewed strengthening of U.S.–Turkey relations, and what are the potential implications for regional stability?
I think we should set some context. The former Biden administration also moved closer to Erdogan after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Remember, it was Biden who thanked Erdogan publicly for finally agreeing to Sweden joining Nato and promising him F-16’s. But in general, yes.
Let’s start with Syria, I think Trump has already de facto recognized a Turkish zone of influence in Syria. Remember, Trump said publicly that Turkey had done an “unfriendly” takeover of Syria when HTS ousted Assad. Trump also told Netanyahu in the White House that he could manage deconfliction between the Turks and then Israelis in Syria. Meanwhile, Trump is already moving to pull US troops out of northeast Syria. The Israelis lobbied Trump hard to keep them there, and Trump resisted this. A direct meeting between Trump and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, which has been confirmed, will be a major breakthrough for Erdogan of course, but also for Gulf states. Saudi Arabia especially is keen for the sanctions to be lifted on Syria. If Trump lifts sanctions on Syria this could indirectly reduce some Turkish influence by allowing Gulf states like the UAE and Saudi Arabia to come in. The Gulf has the money to fund Syria’s reconstruction. Turkey does not. In that sense, I would say Greece should be supportive of lifting sanctions and then work like crazy with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France make economic deals with the new Syrian government. The more Sharaa has options the less dependent he will be on Turkey. The worst outcome for Greece would be the combination of sanctions and Israeli strikes making Syria into a Libya where Turkey dominates militarily on the ground.
I know the main question for Greece is how Trump will view the Eastern Mediterranean. For decades, Greeks, and to be honest, Turks, could rely on the US to intervene when tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean over uninhibited islands or territorial waters escalated. I think the US’s is less and less interested in intervening. I think that what Greece offers the US as an ally, however is constant. Greece allows the US to project maritime power in the Eastern Mediterranean. As the US moves to reduce its footprint in the Middle East and Europe, Greece will be a one stop shop for the US to continue projecting power in both regions.
That takes us to your book, The New Byzantines: The Rise of Greece and Return of the Near East, forthcoming with Hurst, right?
Exactly. What I argue is that Greece sits in the middle of an arc of instability stretching from the Black Sea to the Red Sea. Since 1821 there has been an inherent tension whether Greece belongs to the East or West. The post-WWII era saw Greece focused on joining the West. I argue that now Greece is being reabsorbed into the Near East. As a Greek American, I know all too well that this is controversial in Greece. But what I argue is that Greece is attractive as an ally to the US and as an investment destination because it belongs to the East. The center of gravity in this part of the world is shifting East. That has real challenges for Greece. Turkey’s rise as an independent middle power puts Greece in the hot-zone and the risk of instability in Egypt due to the major economic crisis there could supercharge migration. But there are also huge opportunities when you look at Greece’s potential to partner with countries liken the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The surge of investment from the Middle East into Greece is a direct consequence of the return of the Near East. When the war in Ukraine ends and reconstruction starts, that will also shift the center of gravity in Europe further East. The idea for the New Byzantines was to explore all of these trends traveling in Greece’s eastern borderlands and then in neighboring countries including Israel, Egypt and Turkey where historic Greek communities still live. In a multipolar world where the East is rising, Greece will benefit by being Byzantine again.
