Just as the world breathed a sigh of relief with the end of the Covid pandemic, another global shock rolled along. And while Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 seemed like a “throwback” to a bygone era of continental mega-clashes, it would rapidly usher in a new era in warfare in which remotely controlled weapon platforms would figure prominently in the air, at sea and on land.
The world’s screens and social media were soon showcasing the bewildering array of remote weapon platforms—drones, UAVs, UCAVs—which Ukraine and Russia use to attack each other from the air, defend themselves from attacks, monitor battlefields, communicate and jam signals. Ukrainian unmanned marine vehicles (UMV) have decimated Russia’s once formidable Black Sea fleet, while clandestinely transported and launched UAVs have recently struck airbases as far afield as Siberia.
A service member of the 429th Achilles Separate Unmanned Aerial Systems Regiment prepares an FPV-drone for a fly at a position near the front line town of Kupiansk, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, in Kharkiv region, Ukraine June 23, 2025. REUTERS/Viacheslav Ratynskyi
The concept of “loitering munitions” and the deadly use to which they can be put would also be spotlit in the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh, with eerie videos of unsuspecting combatants being attacked by remote-controlled assailants.
Significantly for Greece, neighboring Turkey—a NATO ally on the face of it, but a rival more often than not—was heavily involved in the conflict, supplying weapons systems and operators to “fraternal” Azerbaijan. That Turkey has developed significant remote platforms, with Erdogan-era Turkey also investing heavily in domestic defense R&D and production, has certainly not escaped the notice of policy- and decision-makers in Athens.
Post October 7
What followed was an even more striking “accelerant” of 21st warfare: Hamas’ terrorist incursions and “asymmetric” attacks in southern Israel and the Israelis’ devastating response. Then came the weaponizing of Hezbollah pagers and walkie-talkies in 2024 and, this month, Tel Aviv’s staggering surprise attack on Iranian military targets and suspected nuclear facilities. Amazingly, the latter were combined with “surgical strikes” against individual commanders and scientists—which were directed remotely from thousands of kilometers away, and over at least two other countries.
Athens takes note
Athens’ long-term strategy was partially unveiled in late April, with Defense Minister Nikos Dendias briefing Parliament on a 12-year armaments program billed as costing between 25 and 28 billion euros. Highlights included the acquisition of new warplanes, surface vessels, subs and accompanying weapons systems, plus a target of 25 percent participation by the domestic defense industry. He also cited Greece’s plan to develop, acquire and field an air defense system modeled on Israel’s “Iron Dome“.
Minister of National Defense, Nikos Dendias, observes guided missile training exercises conducted by the Hellenic Navy and Air Force from the frigate Adrias on Monday, June 23, 2025./EUROKINISSI
Asked about the remarkable developments on battlefields globally over the past three and a half years and how this affects concept of “strategic depth,” political and international relations specialist Konstantinos Balomenos noted that “by evaluating data from the recent military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, Libya, Ukraine and the Middle East, which have combined conventional and hybrid unconventional means in the field through the use of offensive drones, anti-drone systems, modern missile and anti-aircraft systems, we can conclude that the concept of strategic depth has indeed changed radically in recent years.”
On his part, when referring to the country’s current “defense dogma” in the face of these developments, the former chief of the Hellenic Navy General Staff (HNGS), Vice Admiral Ioannis Drymousis (retd), told To BHMA International that it continues to revolve squarely around the concept of “deterrence”.
Vice Admiral Ioannis Drymousis (retd)
“If you see a weak opponent, an easy win, at some point you’ll slap him. We need powerful armed forces for deterrence, not small and flexible units—as some quarters advise.”
Drymousis, who served as the commander of the Greek navy from January 2023 to January 2024, said the country’s naval forces must now confront an expanded threat that extends from the east Mediterranean to Libya and even into the Adriatic—a reference to Turkey, as he goes on to cite Turkish naval vessels docking in the Albanian port of Durres.
Live-fire training exercises of guided missiles conducted by the Hellenic Navy and Air Force from the frigate Adrias on Monday, June 23, 2025. /EUROKINISSI
Touching on the naval component of such a deterrence, the former Greek commander said calculations showed that a certain number of “large strike vessels”—frigates and large corvettes—were needed by Greece to meet the challenges, although he declined to specify the precise number.
Key characteristics of such vessels, he added, include powerful, state-of-the-art radars, inter-operability with other platforms, such as the F-35s the Hellenic Air Force will soon be acquiring, as well as ship-board launchers that can fire most missile types – and lots of them.
He didn’t hide his personal preference, which would be for the Hellenic Navy’s older S-class frigate fleet to be replaced by Constellation-class guided missile frigates, in fact.
Balomenos, who was general director of national defense policy and international relations at Greece’s defense ministry until this year and continues to lecture in Greece’s military academies, said recent battlefield innovations have transformed the concept of “strategic depth”, geographical distance and planning.
Konstantinos Balomenos
Which is something the Greek side is keenly studying.
And the conclusion? That meaningful doctrinal change requires the integration of UAVs/UCAVs/UUVs “…not as supplementary systems, but as organic parts of the armed forces’ structure, with operational autonomy, first-strike roles and inactive operation with manned platforms.
“Greece must accelerate its adaptation to the new operational environment and proceed not only to the acquisition of new-generation autonomous systems, but also to a complete change of perceptions, organizational structures and operational doctrine,” he said, adding:
“This change doesn’t only concern the armed forces. It informs the overall approach to our country’s defense and security, as contemporary threats are spread across multiple levels: military, political, economic, social and information systems.”
The ‘lesson’ of Ukraine
“Ukraine has shown Greece that investment in civilian technological innovation surpasses military innovation. Greece does have a defense industry, I insist on that. It is small, but it could have been bigger. Our problem is that during the decade-long economic crisis, Greece’s armed forces couldn’t make use of this sector”. So notes Antonis Kamaras, research associate at the Athens-based Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).
In terms of the all-important question of spending, Kamaras said the east Mediterranean country “doesn’t spend a great deal on defense in real terms, but it does as a percentage of its GDP—though not as much as it could, given the threats confronting it. We need to become more affluent to fund our defense to a level commensurate with the threat we face. In the mid-term we must be more target-oriented and frugal in terms of military spending,” he said, essentially referring to a “Turkish threat” from the east.
His advice to strategic and tactically minded defense planners in Athens:
“Scrap old weapons systems, close useless bases, then upgrade and maintain the systems you keep. Weapons systems require maintenance in the long term, and you shouldn’t waste resources. Look at Ukraine, which created a military with little money and projected power through innovation. Their asymmetric threats were produced by the best minds they had.”
