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Greek tragedy runs on a simple engine: the warnings are clear, everyone sees them, and the choice that leads to catastrophe is made anyway. The audience suffers not because the ending is a surprise but because it was avoidable. Artificial intelligence is becoming the most consequential technology of our lifetimes, and the warnings are now clearly coming from every direction. The most advanced systems are beginning to accelerate scientific discovery, transform economies, reshape military power, and alter the balance of influence among states. Like nuclear technology, space, or the Internet before it, advanced AI is no longer simply an innovation policy issue; it has become a question of international order. The decisions made over the next few years will shape not only economic competitiveness but also national security, diplomatic influence, and the rules that govern the global digital economy. Socio-technical forces of this magnitude are governed one way or another. The question is by whom. And that answer is being negotiated today. Consider what has happened in the last few months. In July, in Shanghai, twenty-nine countries signed the founding agreement of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, a new intergovernmental body headquartered in China, with Russia, Indonesia, and Brazil among its members. It is designed to become a focal point for technical cooperation and governance among countries increasingly aligned with Beijing’s vision of digital development. This came one week after the United Nations convened its first Global Dialogue on AI governance in Geneva, where governments, industry, civil society, and researchers debated how international cooperation on frontier AI should evolve. Earlier, in June, Washington expanded Pax Silica, its flagship coalition on AI and supply-chain security, to 24 signatories, reflecting a growing effort among democracies to coordinate around trusted infrastructure and strategic technologies. Meanwhile, the heads of the leading frontier AI companies, the very people building these systems, have publicly converged on the view that the most capable models need independent testing, public oversight, and international coordination. These developments are different in form but remarkably similar in direction. Governments agree that AI cannot remain ungoverned. The debate over whether advanced AI requires governance has effectively ended. What remains is the competition over who writes the rules, who sets the standards, and whose institutions become indispensable. Greece is not absent from this picture. It signed the Pax Silica Declaration in June, alongside the European Union, Germany, and the Netherlands. It has a national AI strategy, the Blueprint for Greece’ s AI Transformation, and a new national framework for the implementation of the AI Act. It participates in European digital policymaking, including across the EU AI Board subgroups, and it has begun to leave its mark on the substance of the rules. For example, in the negotiations over the AI Act’s transparency obligations under Article 50, Greece was among the few member states arguing against a broad postponement. Beyond the European Union, Greece contributes policy input across international fora such as the OECD and GPAI, where it has promoted its “AI for All” initiative as a model for public awareness. The opportunity now is to consolidate these efforts into a more ambitious and deliberate international strategy: to treat AI not only as a domestic innovation challenge but as a foreign policy priority, and to define clearly what Greece wants from the international order taking shape.

The instinct will be to dismiss this as a contest between Washington and Beijing, leaving little room for countries the size of Greece. It was, after all, a Greek who gave that instinct its most famous expression. Thucydides had the Athenians tell the Melians that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. Yet history offers another lesson. Small and middle powers are often most influential precisely when new international regimes are taking shape. They build coalitions, broker compromises, develop norms, and establish institutions before power becomes entrenched. The past year offers ample evidence. The Netherlands published a dedicated international AI strategy led by its foreign ministry, organised around competitiveness, technological sovereignty, and AI safety, while explicitly prioritising partnerships with like-minded countries. South Korea co-founded the international process on responsible military AI and hosted a global AI summit. Singapore has become a global reference point for AI testing, evaluation, and standards despite its modest size. None of these countries dominate AI development. What they have done is identify niches where they possess credibility and then convert that credibility into diplomatic influence.

Greece can do the same, leveraging its assets.

It sits at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa, and that geography now carries digital weight: more than fourteen international submarine cables land on Greek shores, including systems such as 2Africa and Medusa, while Microsoft, Amazon, and Google keep investing in Greek cloud infrastructure and data centres. Greek researchers hold leading positions across the global AI ecosystem, from universities to frontier laboratories. And few countries have a historical narrative as naturally tied to democratic self-government, which matters because the hardest questions about advanced AI, concerning accountability, transparency, and the concentration of power, are as much constitutional as technical. What Greece has lacked is not expertise or standing but a national project that connects them to a clear international ambition. Above all, it has a fleeting opening. The ancient Greeks distinguished chronos, time that merely passes, from kairos, the decisive moment when action counts. Greece holds a seat on the UN Security Council through the end of this year and assumes the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of 2027. Few countries its size enjoy two such platforms in such close succession. This is kairos.

So what would an updated international strategy for advanced AI actually contain, and what can Greece realistically do with it? Building on Greece’s existing digital and innovation policies, it would treat AI as an instrument of foreign policy. Such a strategy could include three pillars.

First, strengthen domestic and regional capacity to evaluate and verify frontier AI. Beyond building European technological sovereignty, the ability to verify these systems is what helps secure a seat at the table where the international rules are written. History of other powerful technologies bears this out. In nuclear arms control, for example, it was the states that could monitor tests and inspect facilities that shaped the treaties. Verification confers credibility, and credibility confers influence. From August, the European Commission has the legal right to test the most capable models and require changes, but the means to do so remain underdeveloped. A country like Greece, that builds robust verification and evaluation capacity, as well as a robust institutional mechanism to sustain it, can meaningfully help shape how these systems are developed and deployed.

Second, continue supporting the enforcement and implementation of the EU AI Act. Specifically, in the near term, that means making full use of the enforcement powers under Articles 91, 92, 93 and 101 of the AI Act, including the powers to request documentation, conduct evaluations, request measures, and impose fines. The European Summit this autumn is an early opportunity for the Prime Minister to
champion this agenda, and Greece’s Council Presidency in the second half of 2027 a platform to carry it forward. In parallel, Greece can encourage the EU to strengthen guardrails against national and regional security threats, and accountability regimes that keep humans firmly in control and legally liable.

Third, establish a dedicated tech diplomacy agenda to forge coalitions built on shared values. Where this capability sits within the government is an administrative choice, but it must bring together the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Digital Governance. A growing number of states have created dedicated envoys and structures for technology diplomacy, each tailored to its own institutions. Greece should keep pace, elevating tech diplomacy from a technical-policy concern to a priority of national, European, and foreign policy. Authority and execution are what matter: a single locus for AI diplomacy, a diplomatic corps fluent in AI governance and technical verification, and a mandate for nimble minilateralism beyond EU and NATO borders. Greece can engage middle powers across the Eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf, Latin America, and the Global South that value democratic oversight. Geography already positions Greece as a bridge between Europe and the Global South, a role it can elevate by mapping its place in the global AI supply chain. Alignment with Brussels remains essential, but Greece need not wait for other Western capitals to carry its global interests. By brokering norm-based alliances beyond the US-China binary, Greece moves from a subscriber of external rules to a co-author of international standards.

In ancient tragedy, the chorus sees everything yet changes nothing. Greece’s challenge is not noticing the shifting world nor taking the first step. It is already doing both. The challenge is acting by design: turning isolated successes into strategy, and strategy into impact. The next act is being written today, and Greece must hold the pen.

Niki Iliadis leads the International AI Governance portfolio at The Future Society, advancing international cooperation on the governance of advanced AI and directing The Athens Roundtable on AI and the Rule of Law.

Dr. Konstantinos Komaitis is a resident senior fellow with the Democracy and Technology Initiative at the Atlantic Council, leading the work on digital governance and democracy.