A geopolitical saga that began under President Donald Trump may well find its resolution during his second term: the United States is quietly laying the groundwork to lift sanctions on Turkey — a move that could potentially reopen the door to Ankara’s reentry into the F-35 fighter jet program.

According to sources in Washington, the Trump administration has issued a high-level directive to set the groundwork toward easing the restrictions imposed under the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). These sanctions, triggered by Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems, led to Ankara’s removal from the F-35 program in 2020.

John Sitilides, a geopolitical strategist at Trilogy Advisors LLC, outlined the arguments put forward by Ankara and its representatives in Washington as they seek to persuade the Trump administration to ease or lift the sanctions.

“Ankara’s argument will largely be based on the fact that Turkey is integrally engaged in many of the key foreign policy and national security issues that currently bedevil the Trump administration — from the Middle East to Ukraine, and from South Asia to Africa,” he said, citing Turkey’s military footprint in Somalia and its involvement in Libya’s ongoing conflict.

“And the argument from Ankara,” Mr. Sitilides added, “will be that Turkey can be a far more willing, productive, and cooperative partner in helping the Trump objectives in key areas of war and crises if the sanctions are lifted or somehow relaxed.”

Though no formal announcement has been made, the administration’s message is clear: the CAATSA regime may not be permanent. U.S. officials have begun preliminary work to unwind the sanctions, but even in a post-CAATSA landscape, Turkey’s path back to the F-35 is anything but straightforward.

No Return to Production

Even if sanctions are lifted, U.S. officials have made clear that Ankara will not be reinstated into the F-35 production consortium—a position it once held before its expulsion. At best Turkey could receive delivery of six F-35 aircraft it purchased prior to the 2020 cutoff. Those jets remain in U.S. custody and would still require additional technical work before they could be deployed.

Any further sale of F-35s would require a new Foreign Military Sales (FMS) request to Congress, where bipartisan opposition remains strong.

Lawmakers from both parties have raised concerns not only about Turkey’s regional posture but also its ambivalence toward completing a separate deal for F-16 fighter jets. “It’s difficult to move forward with a new FMS program for F-35s when the F-16 agreement is still hanging in the balance,” a congressional aide told To Vima. “We need to resolve one issue before opening another.”

F-16s, Congress, and Geopolitical Tradeoffs

While Congress plays an important oversight role in both sanctions policy and foreign military sales, the president retains sweeping authority in both domains. Lawmakers can delay arms transfers or oppose the lifting of sanctions, but they cannot permanently block either unless they secure a veto-proof majority.

President Biden has largely respected congressional sentiment, often seeking consensus before advancing major Foreign Military Sales (FMS). In contrast, President Trump has shown far less inclination toward such restraint. For example, in 2019, he bypassed bipartisan objections to arms sales to Saudi Arabia by invoking an emergency national security waiver—demonstrating how readily the executive can override congressional resistance.

Greek-Israeli Coordination

Behind the scenes, Greece and Israel have continued to press their case in Washington. Though Israeli officials had previously refrained from expending political capital to counter Turkey, that changed with the collapse of the Syrian regime, which shifted regional dynamics and raised the stakes of Ankara’s military modernization.

Greek officials, often in coordination with Israeli diplomats, have warned U.S. lawmakers and administration officials that rearming Turkey —particularly with advanced systems like the F-35 — could, in the long run, destabilize the eastern Mediterranean and undermine American strategic interests.

That argument resonates more in Congress than in the executive branch. Outside the S-400 issue, State Department and White House officials are reportedly less opposed to a modernized Turkish air force.

Still, the Biden administration had worked to reassure Athens. Though Greece lacks the legal guarantees enjoyed by Israel—which is granted a qualitative military edge under U.S. law—the White House has made informal commitments to preserve Greek deterrence capabilities.

A Presidential Assurance

President Biden personally offered such reassurances to Father Alexander Karloutsos, the influential Greek-American cleric, during a private Oval Office meeting following his receipt of the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

Biden reportedly explained that Turkey would receive F-16s to maintain a functional air force, while Greece would preserve its advantage through the F-35 program.

Similar messages were delivered by senior officials, including then-Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland during her 2022 visit to Athens, where she met with Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and top cabinet members.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken also conveyed U.S. support in a letter to the Greek prime minister, pledging surplus defense equipment through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. But nearly all of those commitments remain unfulfilled. Logistical and financial hurdles have stalled the delivery of key systems—most notably, two C-130 aircraft that, upon inspection, were found to be older than Greece’s existing fleet and prohibitively expensive to refurbish.

The Congressional Factor

Greece and the Greek-American lobby have grown increasingly effective in Washington, particularly in navigating the intricacies of Capitol Hill. Many attribute this success to lessons learned from the Israeli model of bipartisan congressional engagement.

In his memoir Bibi: My Story, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reflects on his early frustrations with the U.S. executive branch and the strategic shift toward Congress that followed. The Greek strategy in recent years has echoed this approach.

But under Trump—or in a second Trump term—that playbook may prove less effective. “This is a different scenario,” said a congressional staffer. “Congress doesn’t have the same balancing power in Trump’s Washington.”

As the evolving sanctions debate shows, the future of U.S.-Turkey defense relations may ultimately be shaped more by political dynamics in the White House than by bipartisan consensus on Capitol Hill.