For years, Turkey’s image in Washington was that of a black sheep that may have been troublesome but nevertheless remained useful. Now, ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara next Tuesday and Wednesday, that image has been completely reversed. In the eyes of American diplomacy, Turkey appears as a model country. So much so that the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, has called on the Allies to become “more like Turkey” by following the example of the Turkish defense industry.
In Ankara, the progress made since The Hague will be assessed, where the Allies committed in June 2025 to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. For Washington, the question is no longer simply who spends more. It is who can produce more, and faster.
This is precisely where the new narrative about Turkey is rooted. Through statements by U.S. and NATO officials, as well as through the discussion being cultivated in Washington think tanks, Ankara is being presented as a model of defense industrial strength.
The country that for years has been excluded from the F-35 program because of the S-400s is now being portrayed as an ally possessing the production capabilities that NATO urgently needs, having developed factories, shipyards, drones, and munitions.
Trump’s “gifts” to Erdoğan
If the Turkish president had a wish list that he hoped the United States would fulfill, it now appears that he can cross off yet another item. The reason is that, from the familiar couch in the Oval Office, Donald Trump hinted that he would arrive in Ankara for the NATO summit carrying a “major gift.”
At almost the same moment, the official letter left the State Department for Congress announcing the intention to sell Turkey the General Electric (GE) engines necessary for the development of the KAAN, Turkey’s first domestically produced fighter aircraft.
Granting this request is not merely a gesture of goodwill. On the contrary, it comes on top of a series of political victories that the United States has generously offered Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since Trump’s return to the White House. Anyone looking back at the Turkish president’s principal headaches in Washington will see that they have begun disappearing one by one. First and foremost were the Kurdish fighters in northern Syria, who were left at the mercy of President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s forces. Shortly afterward, al-Sharaa crossed the threshold of the White House, accompanied by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, and departed having secured the lifting of U.S. sanctions.
Next came the case of the Turkish bank Halkbank, which had been accused of violating U.S. sanctions against Iran. Despite rulings by the American judiciary that had paved the way for the case to proceed to trial, the Trump administration ensured that it disappeared from the map. And all of this, which under other circumstances would have caused political upheaval in Washington, passed almost unnoticed, with the White House paying virtually no political cost.
Now, with the engine issue considered essentially settled, attention is turning to the F-35s, which apparently remain the last major objective President Erdoğan hopes to secure.
Engines and F-35s: Two different cases
The truth is that the sale of engines for the KAAN fighters has not encountered in Congress the opposition generated by the F-35 issue, because the two matters are entirely different from both legal and political perspectives.
From a legal standpoint, GE engines are not subject to the restrictions imposed by the CAATSA sanctions and the amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which strictly govern the F-35 case. Indeed, the U.S. administration appears to be particularly careful regarding the technical procedure through which the sale will be carried out, so that there can be no doubt that American law is being followed to the letter.
Politically, the engines—being of an older generation—are not viewed by Congress as providing Turkey with a comparative military advantage, and therefore are not considered an issue warranting a direct confrontation with the White House. This became evident in the stance adopted by three of the four senior members of the relevant House and Senate committees. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch, and the committee’s ranking Democrat Jeanne Shaheen all set aside their initial reservations and gave the green light.
The sole exception was Gregory Meeks, the senior Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who remains opposed to the sale, insisting that he had not received from the State Department the required briefing explaining the rationale behind the move.
For the White House, therefore, this represents the easiest political concession, as Middle East Institute analyst Gönül Tol described it—a move that allows President Trump to arrive in Ankara without empty hands, while at the same time not yielding on the F-35 issue.
The F-35 case is regarded as significantly different from that of the engines, both because of the strict legal restrictions and because of strong congressional opposition. Nevertheless, the sale of engines for the KAAN is viewed on Capitol Hill as a critical test of how far Congress is willing to allow the Trump administration to go if it attempts a solution that resolves the S-400 issue formally, but not substantively.
With that in mind, Democratic Representative Dina Titus of Nevada reacted immediately with two initiatives. First, she sent a letter to House leadership requesting an immediate response using all available legislative tools should the Trump administration attempt to proceed with the F-35 issue. She then introduced a joint resolution of disapproval regarding the engine sale, seeking to send a message of political determination to the White House.
The distinction between the two initiatives is not accidental. Because the F-35s fall under the CAATSA sanctions regime, only House Republican Majority Leader Steve Scalise and House Democratic Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries have the authority to block a potential F-35 sale. By contrast, regarding the engine sale, any lawmaker may attempt to block the transaction—a possibility Titus exercised through her resolution.
These moves, however, exposed significant differences between Democratic and Republican lawmakers, publicly breaking for the first time the image of a united front that the Congressional Hellenic Caucus had projected in the House of Representatives.
Republican Representatives Gus Bilirakis and Nicole Malliotakis did not support either of Titus’s initiatives. Their abstention may reflect reluctance to align themselves with a Democratic lawmaker against a president who has shown little tolerance for dissent. Instead, they chose to issue a joint statement with Greek-American Representatives Mike Haridopolos and Jimmy Patronis, whose candidacies in Florida had been personally endorsed by President Trump.
The cracks in the front supporting Greek positions became evident when Titus went on the offensive, calling on Malliotakis to back the F-35 initiatives with her signature—a move constituting the first public disagreement between Greek-American members of Congress on such an issue.
According to information obtained by To Vima, however, Bilirakis’s side in particular insists that existing channels of communication with Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth will be used to ensure that the appropriate messages reach the proper recipients.
Turkey’s “agent” and the lobbying firms
Much can be written about the influence of the Greek diaspora, Athens’ strategy, and the role of lobbying firms. However, in an administration that operates according to the logic of an inner circle rather than institutions, such an analysis does not present the full picture.
In this new landscape, everyone in Washington appears to agree that U.S. Ambassador to Ankara Tom Barrack, one of the individuals with the best access to Trump, has emerged as the most effective “agent” of Turkish positions, despite the fact that Turkey maintains contracts with at least three lobbying firms in the American capital.
Sources on Capitol Hill speaking to To Vima reveal that Barrack systematically cultivates relationships with lawmakers from both parties. As they note, he is a figure broadly respected because both Republicans and Democrats believe he produced results on the particularly difficult Syrian front. Even giants of the American pro-Israel lobby, such as AIPAC, ran into a wall when they targeted Barrack by circulating a letter in Congress for signatures. “It is remarkable how few Republicans signed the letter. Everyone knows Barrack is Trump’s favorite ambassador, and everyone fears his reaction,” observed a senior official from the pro-Israel lobby.
For its part, Greece considered it advisable to retain the services of the lobbying firm BGR in order to have an additional safeguard in a landscape that had once again become unpredictable following Trump’s return. However, regarding Athens’ two major priorities, BGR’s contribution does not so far appear to have made a decisive difference. The next Greece-U.S. Strategic Dialogue remains pending, while the convening of the 3+1 format at the level of foreign ministers has yet to be scheduled.
The same applies to the number one legislative initiative of Greek interest, the EastMed Gateway Act, for which, it appears, BGR’s services were not even sought. Its successful legislative progress so far has been due primarily to the efforts of the diaspora organization HALC.
This does not mean that BGR has contributed nothing. Among its strengths is its thorough knowledge of Washington’s behind-the-scenes political environment and its ability to provide useful insights. The firm is also largely credited with cultivating the relationship with Republican Senator Roger Wicker, chairman of the influential Senate Armed Services Committee, as well as with arranging his visits to Greece.
Individuals who have spent many years working in Washington’s lobbying industry explain to To Vima that there is also an issue of realistic expectations: lobbying firms rarely produce “political victories” on their own.
The same sources estimate that under current circumstances, a more effective strategy might be a different combination: one or two small firms with highly specialized expertise in Congress, together with a medium-sized firm enjoying genuine access to Trump’s inner political circle. “Washington is a small place. There are two or three firms today that have that kind of access,” notes a person familiar with the influence industry in the American capital.
Is there progress on the sale of the F-35s?
The question is where the F-35 issue actually stands. Some in Washington are concerned, viewing the engine sale as the first step through which the White House is testing congressional reactions.
They point to Vice President J.D. Vance’s statement that the administration has instructed the Pentagon to examine how Turkey’s return to the program could technically be accomplished. Others describe such assessments as exaggerated.
They note that Vance also made clear that the final decision rests with Congress, and that the relevant instruction had already been issued at the beginning of Trump’s second term. Despite the messages conveyed by Barrack, no tangible progress has been made since then.
Capitol Hill sources speaking to To Vima insist that they will not accept alternative legal interpretations that provide only a formal solution to the S-400 issue. When the battle over the F-35s began, the primary objective was to buy time.
The informal coalition supporting the campaign included the Greek-American community and members of Congress, the Greek Embassy in Washington, organizations representing the Armenian and Indian diasporas, as well as the pro-Israel lobby, for which the prospect of a Turkey equipped with fifth-generation fighter aircraft constitutes a red line.
However, if the F-35 issue has indeed become a matter of Trump’s personal decision, then no resolution and no lobbying strategy can reach the place where the matter will ultimately be decided. This does not invalidate the efforts of the informal coalition. It simply defines their ceiling.
