Μake us preferred on Google Finland recently became France’s tenth European partner in President Emmanuel Macron’s nuclear deterrence initiative, while Latvia asked this week to join as well. Greece responded to Paris’s invitation back in March, as the only country from NATO’s southern flank. The question for Athens is what participation in the French nuclear umbrella means and what commitments to France come with it.
The Russian nuclear threat and uncertainty over whether US commitments still carry weight have turned European governments toward the French arsenal. Paris is seeking to tie its European partners’ security more closely to its own while keeping its freedom of action. The French president presented the doctrine of “forward deterrence” on March 2 at the Île Longue submarine base in northwestern France. The French nuclear umbrella initially included the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden and Denmark. With Norway joining in May and Finland on September 14, the arrangement now covers a large part of the continent.
French President Emmanuel Macron reviews the troops during his visit to the nuclear submarine navy base of Ile Longue in Crozon, France, March 2, 2026. Yoan Valat /Pool via REUTERS
The Limits Set by Paris
Macron set the limits from the start: “There will be no sharing of the final decision” on the use of nuclear weapons. The use, planning and execution of missions remain an exclusively French matter. The same applies to France’s “vital interests,” which Paris considers to have a European dimension but deliberately avoids defining.
The uncertainty over when France would respond is part of the deterrence strategy. Moscow must now factor in possible French involvement in a European crisis, in addition to the American and British response, so the initiative strengthens NATO deterrence. London takes part in the “umbrella” as a nuclear power. The Northwood Declaration of July 2025 provides for coordination of the two independent arsenals, French and British, along with a joint steering group, giving the two partners the ability to mount a joint nuclear response to an extreme threat.
More Warheads
Behind the French offer is an arsenal of about 290 warheads (as of 2025). It relies on Rafale aircraft, each carrying one ASMPA-R cruise missile (to be replaced in 2035 by the ASN4G), with a range of 2,000 kilometers and a 300-kiloton warhead. At Île Longue, Macron announced an increase in nuclear warheads and said their number will no longer be made public. He repeated that French nuclear weapons are strictly strategic, ruling out tactical use. However, the weapons carried by the Rafale are de facto tactical nuclear weapons, and this reveals a mismatch.
Allies will be able to take part with conventional forces and support French missions, in coordination with Paris, during a crisis. Under certain conditions, French strategic aircraft may also be temporarily deployed on their territory. No permanent stationing of nuclear weapons has been announced.
For France, access to allied bases provides strategic depth, since dispersing aircraft makes a surprise strike harder and complicates an adversary’s planning. For the host country, the presence of these aircraft “locks” its security to France’s: an attack could hit French forces, making Paris’s involvement more likely.
The Role of the North
Berlin is also actively involved. The joint statement by Macron and Chancellor Friedrich Merz provides for a nuclear coordination group, dialogue on doctrine and consultations on combining conventional, missile defense and French nuclear capabilities.
Germany remains part of NATO’s nuclear planning while also gaining an organized channel to the EU’s only nuclear power. For Poland, the priority is deterring a Russian attack against it. The first meeting of the Franco-Polish nuclear coordination group, on July 10, produced a joint roadmap for consultations and military cooperation.
In the North, Sweden and Denmark focus on regional security. Stockholm activated a bilateral nuclear coordination group, and Sweden’s contribution consists of air forces, surveillance assets and air defense systems, giving it a role without a nuclear arsenal of its own.
Norway aims to avoid depending on a single source of security. NATO remains central to its defense and the US remains its most important ally, but its European ties are growing stronger through its agreement with France. In Helsinki, the agreement opens the way for strategic consultations and crisis management before any potential use of nuclear weapons, with a Franco-Finnish coordination group expected to be activated in the coming months. Both countries maintain a policy of not stationing nuclear weapons in peacetime.
In The Hague and Brussels, participation in the French initiative adds to existing obligations, since the Netherlands and Belgium host US nuclear weapons and take part in NATO planning. At the same time, it opens channels of military communication with Paris.
The Greek-French Agreement
Greece’s participation gives the plan a bulwark in Southeastern Europe and offers Athens an even closer strategic relationship with France, while increasing the value of the Greek-French mutual defense assistance agreement. However, the public commitments do not point to an automatic French nuclear guarantee in the event of a Greek-Turkish crisis, since the French umbrella is clearly aimed primarily at Russia.
Greece will need to give its participation concrete form through bilateral agreements, exercises and support missions. Early warning, missile defense, surveillance and long-range conventional strikes are areas where it can both contribute and benefit. In bilateral talks, Athens must secure a clear picture of the role of the Greek Armed Forces, access to intelligence and the support Paris would provide in a possible crisis with Russia. These factors will determine how much security Greece gains and at what cost in obligations.
Oliver Meier, a nuclear disarmament expert, notes in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that “separate bilateral consultations place Paris at the center, with each partner negotiating alone, at the risk of imbalances in the degree of access and influence and differences in transparency and arms control.”
In any case, participation in the French initiative does not come with a matching say in French decisions. The decision on whether French vital interests are at stake remains with the Élysée. Participating countries take on costs, commit forces and may expose infrastructure to greater risk, without an equal quid pro quo.
