Μake us preferred on Google A decade after Britain voted to leave the European Union, one of the most divisive questions in British politics is back on the agenda: could freedom of movement between the UK and Europe be restored?
In a significant departure from the political orthodoxy that has shaped Britain’s relationship with Brussels since 2016, Prime Minister Andy Burnham has called for an open and evidence-based debate about the country’s future relationship with the EU, including the possibility of restoring free movement and, potentially, returning to the single market.
His intervention, reinforced by comments on Sunday, 25 October, has reignited a debate that successive British governments have sought to avoid. Conservatives have reacted critically, while Nigel Farage has accused the government of abandoning the democratic mandate delivered by the Brexit referendum.
Yet the discussion is no longer confined to political speculation.
Business Secretary Jonathan Reynolds has confirmed that British and European officials are preparing to examine options for their future relationship ahead of the EU summit on 20 November.
Downing Street insists that the immediate priorities remain more limited agreements covering food and drink, electricity, emissions trading and youth mobility. Any fundamental change, Burnham has indicated, would require a fresh electoral mandate.
For businesses struggling to recruit workers, European citizens facing expensive visa requirements and British exporters confronting trade barriers, however, the prospect of a closer relationship raises questions with considerable economic consequences.
A political taboo begins to crumble
Speaking to To Vima, Jonathan Portes, Professor of Economics and Public Policy at King’s College London, describes the government’s changing position as remarkable.
“This is a big shift: in just a few months the government has gone from thinking about a limited youth mobility scheme (as part of the ‘reset’ at the November summit) to openly contemplating free movement, which has long been politically off limits in the UK.”
Nevertheless, he cautions against expecting immediate results.
“This isn’t going to happen any time soon: it requires a political mandate in the UK, which in turn requires an election, and even then all that would do is enable the government to start negotiations with the EU which inevitably would be long and difficult.”
The significance of Burnham’s intervention is also apparent to Simon Usherwood, Professor of Politics and International Studies at The Open University.
Speaking to To Vima, he argues that the Prime Minister’s comments represent the first serious governmental attempt to challenge the assumptions underpinning Britain’s post-Brexit settlement.
“Burnham’s comments reflect a significant political shift, namely the willingness to criticise the consequences of Brexit and to try to explore the potential upsides of closer cooperation with the EU.”
He notes that no government has pursued such an approach since Theresa May established her Brexit red lines in early 2017, ruling out membership of the customs union and single market, alongside freedom of movement.
The political landscape may be changing, but the practical difficulties have not disappeared.
The economic price of Brexit
For economists, the potential benefits of closer integration are considerably clearer than the political route towards achieving it.
Usherwood estimates that Brexit has left Britain’s GDP roughly 4 per cent below where it would otherwise have been.
“Economically, this is old news,” he says, arguing that the economic damage anticipated before the referendum has been borne out by subsequent experience.
Anand Menon, a leading expert on British politics and the UK-EU relationship, believes the greatest potential gains would come not simply from restoring migration rights, but from regaining access to the single market.
“Let’s be honest, the ultimate economic benefit of it wouldn’t be the freedom of movement, it would be the single market.”
Research, he explains, suggests that much of Brexit’s economic impact stems from Britain’s departure from the single market, which previously allowed businesses to trade with fewer regulatory and administrative obstacles.
Restoring free movement would nevertheless bring additional advantages, particularly for employers seeking skills that are difficult to recruit domestically.
Portes agrees, arguing that easier movement of workers would improve recruitment across multiple sectors and allow people to respond more readily to employment opportunities.
He also challenges the argument that European migration necessarily undermines British workers.
“The evidence suggests that EU migration made a positive contribution to the UK economy and public finances, with little overall negative impact on the wages or employment of UK-born workers.”
However, he expects future migration patterns to differ from those of the years preceding Brexit, with flows unlikely to return to their previous scale.
Could Britain return to the single market without rejoining the EU?
The legal and institutional obstacles are substantial.
Catherine Barnard, Professor of European Law, tells To Vima that restoring full freedom of movement is not a realistic immediate prospect.
“At the moment there is no realistic chance of us undertaking freedom of movement. It would have to be part of a package of rejoining the single market.”
One possible route would involve Britain joining the European Free Trade Association, alongside countries such as Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, before participating in the European Economic Area.
Such an arrangement would provide extensive single-market access without full EU membership.
But it would also require Britain to accept significant European rules without participating fully in their creation.
“The EEA would make us a rule taker,” Barnard explains, describing this as a particularly difficult position for a country of Britain’s size and political self-confidence.
Menon also considers a single-market arrangement theoretically possible without formal EU membership, although he emphasises Brussels’ insistence on maintaining the relationship between the four freedoms: goods, services, capital and people.
In practice, Britain would struggle to secure comprehensive market access while continuing to reject freedom of movement.
That presents Burnham with a fundamental choice: pursue limited sectoral agreements or seek a much more ambitious relationship requiring substantial concessions over sovereignty and regulation.
What would change for Greeks?
For Greek citizens, the implications could be especially tangible.
Since Brexit, most Greeks seeking to work in Britain have had to navigate immigration requirements involving visa applications, eligibility criteria, fees and, in many cases, employer sponsorship.
Students have also faced additional financial and administrative barriers, including international tuition fees at many British universities.
A return to free movement could substantially change those conditions.
“For Greeks, as for other EU citizens, free movement would make it much easier to live and work in the UK without the cost and restrictions of the current visa system,” Portes tells To Vima.
British citizens, he adds, would gain equivalent opportunities to work and settle in Greece and elsewhere in the European Union.
Students could also benefit from increased mobility and potentially lower tuition fees, depending on the eventual arrangements.
Such changes would matter to young Greek professionals, researchers and graduates who previously regarded Britain as a relatively accessible destination for employment and education.
However, a narrower youth mobility agreement would not necessarily restore those rights universally. Its benefits would depend on negotiated conditions, including age restrictions, duration of stay and eligibility.
The referendum question returns
If the economic arguments are relatively straightforward, the democratic questions are considerably more contentious.
Burnham remains constrained by Labour’s 2024 election manifesto, which explicitly ruled out returning to the single market, customs union or freedom of movement.
Barnard believes his intervention may be preparing the ground for a different manifesto at the next general election, due by 2029.
She also argues that a decision to rejoin the EU would probably require another referendum, even if there were no strict legal obligation to hold one.
“I think given there was a referendum to take us out I think there’d need to be a referendum to take us back in.”
Brussels, she suggests, would also want convincing evidence of durable public support before committing to lengthy negotiations.
The prospect of Britain reversing course under a future Conservative government would be a serious concern for European negotiators.
Domestic opposition would be equally challenging.
Barnard points to Labour MPs representing constituencies that voted strongly for Brexit, including Melanie Onn in Grimsby, where reopening the question could carry considerable electoral risks.
Menon identifies two broad political camps: parties favouring closer European cooperation, including Labour, the Liberal Democrats, Greens and nationalist parties; and Conservatives and Reform UK, which favour maintaining a more distant relationship.
He nevertheless regards predictions about another referendum as premature.
A turning point, or another false dawn?
The immediate test will come at November’s EU summit, where the government hopes to deliver practical improvements without abandoning its existing commitments.
Reynolds has stressed that no assumptions have been made about Britain’s eventual relationship with Brussels.
Usherwood believes Burnham has already achieved something politically important by reopening the discussion and exposing the limited appetite among Eurosceptics to defend the existing settlement.
But he warns that enthusiasm should not be confused with a viable negotiating strategy.
Even modest changes could require years of talks, while a future government might abandon the process altogether.
For the EU, political continuity in London will be essential.
A decade after the referendum, Britain is therefore confronting a question that Brexit was supposed to settle: how much economic integration with Europe is it prepared to sacrifice in exchange for greater political autonomy?
The return of free movement remains a distant possibility rather than an imminent policy change. Yet the fact that a British prime minister is openly considering it marks a potentially profound shift.
For millions of Europeans, including Greeks hoping to study, work or build careers in Britain, the outcome could eventually reshape opportunities on both sides of the Channel.
For now, the greatest change is political: a debate once considered closed has been reopened, and Britain’s post-Brexit future is no longer being discussed solely within the boundaries established ten years ago.
