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When it emerged that US intelligence officials believed the world’s most powerful chip boss had been having an affair with an executive who had been recruited by China’s spy agency, many people assumed Nvidia’s chief executive Jensen Huang had been caught in a classic “honeytrap” operation.

But weeks after revelations of the affair — which led to Huang’s resignation — no evidence has been made public to support suggestions that Alice Huang, an executive linked to Singapore-based Megaspeed, was sent to seduce the Nvidia CEO to elicit secrets for Beijing or that she was an agent of China’s Ministry of State Security in any traditional sense.

Still, the scandal has focused unprecedented attention on the MSS and what western officials and analysts say is the powerful ministry’s increasing ability to gather intelligence at all levels of their societies.

“Whether it is industrial policy or espionage — or where the two meet — they can direct, control and pull strings in ways that the US, Europe and others, which have checks and balances in place, cannot,” said one former US defence official still professionally engaged in China security analysis.

Officials and analysts say the MSS, which combines domestic and international security and intelligence operations within a single agency, is formidable in scale and technological capability and wields the distinct and enduring advantage of operating under Beijing’s authoritarian system.

The MSS has reportedly used honeytrap-type tactics involving sexual entrapment and romantic entanglements against targets in the US. A UK parliamentary committee in 2023 quoted MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service, as saying scholars were sometimes invited to China and subjected to “blackmail, honey-trapping, where they try and catch you in a sexually compromising position”.

The MSS itself has repeatedly warned Chinese citizens of the dangers of honeytraps set by overseas intelligence agencies, in 2016 even publishing a comic entitled Dangerous Love that cautioned young women to be wary of foreigners who might be spies.

Matt Brazil, a former US diplomat and now senior fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, a US research group, said the MSS had a particular tendency “to victimise and pressure” members of the Chinese diaspora. “Blackmail and sexual exploitation operations are more common than in other services, the Russian ones excepted,” he added.

Visiting China last week, US President Donald Trump waved aside suggestions that Alice Huang’s relationship with Jensen Huang might have been a threat to national security. “Any pretty woman that comes from China, they consider her to be a spy,” Trump told Fox News. “But, you know, I haven’t heard that she was a spy.”

The FT this month reported that an MSS official approached a person close to Alice Huang earlier this year, seeking more information about her business connections and dealings. This approach implies Alice Huang was not a trained spy.

Alice Huang could not be reached for comment. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson told the FT: “We have previously responded to these issues multiple times. The so-called ‘Chinese spy narrative’ is entirely baseless and constitutes slander and defamation.”

The ministry earlier this month said “China’s sci-tech progress relies on independent innovation and open co-operation”.

Trump appears relaxed about Chinese espionage. “We spy on them too, I think we spy better than they do,” he told Fox during his China trip. But others in the US are more anxious.

American government departments and companies have for years tracked Chinese attempts to solicit information from researchers and engineers involved in developing advanced technology, the former US defence official said.

“It’s not just targeting engineers or mid-level management with immediate technical knowledge. It can go all the way to the top of an organisation and directly affect how that company engages with the US government,” they said.

A private sector intelligence analyst based in the Asia-Pacific said Chinese companies were expanding globally and had become more embedded in international supply chains, creating “more access points” for the MSS.

The MSS also has broad powers that have been crystallised by new national security laws that give it legal authority to coerce people into facilitating intelligence operations and to require them to keep their participation secret.

In contrast, many western organisations came under intensified oversight in the wake of leaks from Edward Snowden, an intelligence contractor who released information about US domestic surveillance in 2013.

“The MSS is not a ‘post-Snowden’ agency — there are no indications of serious privacy constraints sitting on top of what it collects or how it processes data,” said a western private sector open-source researcher who monitors Chinese espionage.

In the US, the Central Intelligence Agency “could try to persuade a US national to support an intelligence operation [but] cannot force people to that”, the researcher said. “The MSS has explicit powers to do that.”

The MSS’s sheer size — some experts estimate it has about 200,000 people working for it — makes it harder for foreign counter-intelligence services to defend against.

Adam Kozy, a former FBI analyst and founder of SinaCyber, a China-focused cyber intelligence consultancy, said the MSS was getting better at combining cyber and human intelligence. He cited a long-running MSS espionage effort in the 2010s to steal gas turbine technology. Two men convicted of involvement in the effort in the US, including an MSS officer, were returned to China by Joe Biden’s administration in late 2024 as part of a prisoner swap.

“That case showed a high degree of co-ordination between the cyber operations, where they had hackers break into aerospace companies, and a parallel human intelligence operation where an MSS officer was recruiting people across the US,” Kozy said.

The MSS could also tap into the huge Chinese population overseas, many of whom were already connected with state groups via diaspora businesses and cultural events, experts said. “They already have a relationship with Beijing that can very easily be converted into an intelligence relationship,” the open-source researcher said.

A New York court last week sentenced Tang Yuanjun, a US citizen previously imprisoned in China as a political dissident, to three years’ probation after he pleaded guilty to failing to register as an agent of China’s government. Prosecutors said Tang gathered information at the MSS’s direction, including recording individuals participating in pro-democracy activities in the US.

Analysts have also noted numerous cases over recent years when foreign authorities have been criticised for their undue suspicion of people with Chinese connections.

The Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly on political power and control of the judicial system give it great leverage to compel individuals to work with the MSS. The private sector analyst said it was common for police to visit the families of Chinese living overseas to encourage their co-operation.

It would be “difficult” to resist, the analyst said, adding that the ability for someone such as Alice Huang to “escape that pressure can be severely limited”.

Link To FT.com: https://www.ft.com/content/77a283dd-b7af-4e72-8d83-9b53ab86f3e0

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