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Poland’s constitutional crisis offers a valuable lesson for European democracies. Eroding the rule of law ​takes far less effort than the arduous task of restoring it after years of institutional decline. The challenge lies in repairing constitutional safeguards while ensuring that the process of restoration is firmly grounded in the law.

The Polish experience illustrates this difficulty. During its years in power from 2015 to 2023, the right-wing populist Law and Justice party (PiS) introduced changes that seriously undermined judicial independence. The Constitutional Tribunal of Poland became the centre of a prolonged confrontation over judicial appointments, constitutional authority and the primacy of EU law. In December 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union found that serious irregularities in the appointment of judges had deprived it of the guarantees required of an independent and impartial court established by law (Case C-448/23, European Commission v. Republic of Poland).

Since taking office in December 2023, Donald Tusk’s government has sought to reverse this institutional deterioration. Yet restoring judicial independence has proved exceptionally difficult. The refusal of President Karol Nawrocki to receive the oaths of newly elected constitutional judges, followed by measures affecting the Tribunal’s leadership in October 2026, has exposed the legal complexities of constitutional restoration. While the earlier PiS-era judicial overhauls are well documented, the lawfulness of some recent corrective measures remains contested.

This distinction deserves attention beyond Poland. A government entrusted with restoring the rule of law cannot assume that the legitimacy of its objectives automatically establishes the legality of its methods. Equally, insisting on procedural requirements should not become an excuse for tolerating the consequences of earlier institutional abuses. Constitutional restoration requires legal certainty, effective remedies and an independent assessment of contested decisions.

Liberal democracy cannot be defenceless against political forces that seek to weaken its institutional foundations. Democratic self-defence is legitimate, and sometimes necessary, particularly when constitutional mechanisms have been used to entrench political control over the judiciary and institutional checks and balances have been seriously weakened. Nevertheless, such measures must always be subject to the principles of legality and proportionality. Otherwise, attempts to heal wounded institutions risk perpetuating the very practices they seek to overcome.

For the European Union (EU), the implications are substantial. Judicial independence is a prerequisite for effective judicial protection and the uniform application of EU law. The Union must insist on compliance with European court judgments while applying consistent legal standards to the actions of national governments, regardless of their political orientation. Its credibility depends on the impartial enforcement of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.

This debate acquires particular relevance ahead of the 2027 elections in several EU member states. Electoral majorities may change, but the independence of national institutional bodies must endure. This requires transparent appointments, credible mechanisms of accountability and safeguards capable of resisting renewed political interference.

Poland’s experience suggests that restoring the rule of law demands more than reversing the practices of a previous government. The durability of reform depends on whether the institutions rebuilt today will remain independent when political power changes hands again.

Dr. Apostolos Samaras holds a Ph.D. in European Law from the Law School of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. He is a Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).