Turkey’s recent decision to issue Presidential Decrees declaring areas as marine parks constitutes yet another serious violation of international law. One of these areas is in the Eastern Aegean and another is south of Kastellorizo. In the first case, it includes an area that begins at the Evros River and extends both into the open sea and into the territorial waters of the island of Imbros, before reaching the eastern territorial waters of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The second begins off the southeastern coast of mainland Turkey and extends deep into the Eastern Mediterranean, effectively encircling Kastellorizo. In practice, it is carrying out in stages the “Blue Homeland” plan that it has been developing for some time.

Marine parks are a relatively new concept in the Law of the Sea, intended to protect the marine environment from pollution and contamination resulting from human activities. They usually cover areas of rare marine wealth that, however, lie within the territorial waters of the coastal state. International law, moreover, provides through marine parks another jurisdictional zone that removes space from the high seas and the freedom of the seas that comes with it. And it does so through a unilateral action that disregards the rights of coastal states adjacent to these areas. This is because the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides for the protection of the environment in areas beyond national jurisdiction while, at the same time, providing for the cooperation of all interested states to achieve this objective. Avoiding isolated, unilateral actions to establish zones provided for under the law is a fundamental principle of modern Law of the Sea. This applies in all areas of the maritime domain where the limited availability of space requires it.

In other words, Turkey’s actions run afoul of international law on two counts. First, because international law does not recognize marine parks outside territorial waters, since they have consequences for the freedom of the seas, and therefore its actions run counter to this supreme principle of international law. Second, because, arguendo, even if such an action were considered legitimate for the sake of protecting the marine environment, it would run counter to the prohibition on unilateral acts imposed by international law.

It is natural for Greece to disregard these new Turkish zones, since these zones violate international law. They also seek to control fishing, as the wealth of these areas consists of potential fishing grounds. These would thus fall under Turkey’s jurisdiction and… protection. It is also clear that, through the establishment of these zones, Turkey seeks to control all the freedoms of the seas. Except one: freedom of navigation, which is the crown jewel of the freedoms of the sea. And it cannot be restricted by an environmental protection zone, especially an illegal one. But even this freedom of freedoms could be abusively affected, as environmental control could lead Turkey to take extreme measures against this freedom in an effort to prevent ships carrying environmentally hazardous cargo from sailing through the area or to exercise its jurisdiction in cases of accidents occurring within these zones.

The critical question is why Turkey chose to deepen the crisis in relations with Greece at this particular moment. I believe the reasonable answer is that the trigger for this hardening of its stance lies in recent Greek actions that have deeply annoyed Ankara. These actions include the granting of a majority stake to a French company in the activities aimed at achieving an electricity interconnection between Greece and Cyprus — and later perhaps Israel — through the much-discussed Great Sea Interconnector. They also include the imminent start of work in the disputed area on preparatory activities ahead of the laying of the cable. Turkey now finds itself in the difficult position of either accepting that the French company carries out its project or entering into direct confrontation with French interests, repeating its actions off Kasos in previous years. In the latter case, this would have consequences for its relations with France.

It is clear that Turkey has a different reading and interpretation of the Athens Declaration from Greece. In other words, it considers that, for every action by our country in the Aegean, Greece must necessarily inform Turkey and perhaps even seek its consent. Greece, meanwhile, reads the Declaration as a text that allows the two countries to proceed with lawful actions in the Aegean and requires the other side to be informed only in cases where the legality of an action is disputed. This, after all, is the logical interpretation, because under any other reading the two countries would become hostages to one another.

But there are other issues that have annoyed Turkey: Greece’s acquisition of modern weapons, such as the Navy’s Belharra frigates; its participation in the F-35 program, in which Turkey is still striving to become a participant; and even the defense shield through which we will secure greater defensive capabilities. All of these are developments that put Turkey in a difficult position. Here we must also mention the Cyprus issue and the recent initiative by the UN secretary-general, which, if successful, and with initiatives by the two parties involved, creates a serious possibility of moving away from Turkey’s extreme proposal for two sovereign states.

Ultimately, how should Greece respond to Turkey’s recent action? In the obvious way: by disregarding the illegal zones, while informing the United Nations and the European Union of these violations, and by lodging a protest with Turkey over the escalation in relations that this action creates. Any other measure would be excessive and would further burden Greek-Turkish relations.

Christos Rozakis is emeritus professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Athens and a former deputy minister.