Μake us preferred on Google And breathe out. It’s morning in Europe as well as America again. Finally, Congress will emerge from the deep freeze to restrain an increasingly erratic president and begin restoring America’s place as the reliable leader of the free world.
One can imagine the relief in European capitals. Just another couple of years to wait out a lame-duck leader and normal service will be resumed. Meanwhile in Britain, many in the political mainstream are already toasting the collateral damage to Nigel Farage’s Reform UK, caused by his proximity to US President Donald Trump.
Is anyone convinced? Let’s park for a moment the immediate fears about the damage a wounded and prideful president can still inflict in his remaining years, how he might sell out Ukraine, take out his fury on Cuba or return to bombing Iran. There are limits to how much Congress can constrain him on foreign policy.
Nor is there any real reason to assume this heralds a similar decline of populist parties in Europe. Though some have suffered reverses, often on the back of anti-corruption campaigns, the economic conditions that have given rise to rightwing populist movements remain. In France Marine Le Pen is the favourite to be the next president.
There is still a strong caucus in the US that appears to admire strongmen. Significant parts of the Republican movement retain an imperial desire to export their politics and, aided by figures like Elon Musk, are boosting parties that seek to erode the pillars of European liberal democracy. And of course, one should never underestimate the capacity of the Democratic Party to mess things up before the next presidential election.
Beyond all this, however, there are also long-term reasons why the UK and Europe cannot afford themselves the luxury of thinking that there is a magic wardrobe back to the world before.
For the loss of a bad America is not the same as the return of the old one. There are grounds for hope that the worst excesses — the endemic corruption, the capricious trashing of allies be it via tariffs, threats to seize Greenland or fawning over Vladimir Putin — will ease post-Trump.
But Trumpism has changed the US in ways that will outlast him. We may be spared the erratic malevolence but there has been what looks like a lasting shift towards disengagement from the world. Most obviously, it has stepped out of the international multilateral order. Perhaps Democrats can restart a conversation on climate change but it will not be easy persuading the US to accept international constraints.
An anti-war sentiment now prevails in both main parties. It was a key component of Trump’s appeal and it is one Americans took to heart. It has too many interests ever to be truly isolationist but the Iran escapade has reinforced those who want America to raise the threshold for intervention. The west’s opponents will know this. (This shift may be even more pressing for Israel, with the Netanyahu government widely blamed for conning Trump into a conflict that brought inflation home).
Even if Republicans do regroup under a new leader, they will not forget the popularity of Trump’s original “America First” manifesto. Democrats may currently be more in tune on Ukraine, but US voters are now less interested in underwriting other countries’ defence. The cold war consensus has shifted and there is a view that Europe’s problems, chief among them containing Russia, are primarily for the continent to solve and finance. A new leader may rhetorically reaffirm the commitment to Nato but Europeans have seen the dangers of contracting out their own security.
Trump has offered another lesson which is not easily erased: that might matters. Europe punches below its weight militarily and diplomatically. It is also being left behind in the technological race. That the EU remains a coalition of nation states with differing interests and governments of different hues will always disadvantage it against the US and China. But they need to heed the argument articulated by the Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney that the choice now for middle powers is to build strategic autonomy or accept subordination.
The temporary denial of Starlink access to Ukraine is a reminder about relying on other nations for essential infrastructure. Similarly, Trump’s tariff wars have also shown the need for the economic might to stand up to America.
And what is true for the EU is even more true for the UK. Andy Burnham used fears of Trump to move more boldly to reintegrate Britain into the European mainstream. Trump’s weakening is no reason for him to slow up. No one wants to dilute the Atlantic alliance but the stronger Europe is, the more likely it is to find America a willing ally. And the UK’s security is entwined with that of its neighbours. Burnham cannot draw back from the defence expenditure commitments he is still only promising to meet.
There is an optimistic scenario in which the US sees that disregarding its alliances, sucking up to its enemies and bullying its friends weakens it in the world. But a return of stability does not mean a return of the old status quo.
And what can change can change back. The core lesson remains not Trump’s defeat this week but his victories before. Much may get easier when he departs but the fears that prompted Europe to reappraise its security, resilience and economic clout must not be forgotten. Strength matters. There are only so many warnings.
Link To FT.com: https://www.ft.com/content/e44a00ff-e5f2-4d1b-af44-90f8a72898ce
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